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1. Background and purpose of the report 
 The project refers to tender no. VT/2008/009, titled: “Methodology for monitoring 
and analysis of the Flexicurity policies in the Member States in the context of the 
Lisbon strategy”. The aim of the project is to develop a methodology for evaluating 
flexicurity policies of the member states. The background is formed by the growing 
importance attached to flexicurity and work-life balance (WLB) policies within the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) and the need to monitor and analyse the 
progress in these domains. For that reason the research forms part of the European 
Commission’s PROGRESS programme for the next few years that aims to link 
flexicurity policies in the employment domain to policies in the social domain in 
regard to social solidarity for establishing a more cohesive society.   
 
1.2 Structure of the report 
 
Our conceptual framework starts off by making a distinction between flexicurity as a 
“state of affairs” (the so-called Stock-Flow-Outcome or SFO-approach) and a “policy 
strategy” (the so-called Effort-State-Challenges or ESC-approach). We first develop a 
conceptual framework for arriving at the definition of a set of single and or 
composite indicators on flexicurity and the work-life balance which we tested in 
particular on the SILC data. Apart from already agreed indicators on employment 
security which we briefly discuss, for the definition of these indicators we will 
especially focus on three other types of indicators as requested by the Commission: 
 
1. The definition of transition indicators dealing with changes in income security 
for people moving from benefits to employment and vice versa.  
2. The definition of work-life balance indicators. Indicators to monitor work-life 
balance are advocated by the EMCO Indicators group in their final report to 
be further developed (EMCO, 2009).  
3. The development of a monitoring tool to evaluate the MS’s policies and 
practices in the flexicurity domain. We devote especially attention to how the 
ESC (efforts-states-challenges)-model could be used for the monitoring of 
flexicurity policies.  
 
Due to the economic crisis, the national reform plans for 2008 in the seven countries 
we originally foresaw in the research proposal to examine on their alignment with 
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the agreed flexicurity guidelines and principles, were mainly focused on reporting 
policies to counteract the consequences of the crisis. For that reason the 
Commission asked us to develop a more general methodology for monitoring 
focusing on the defining a checklist  of subjects and questions that should appear in 
the national reform plans to be able to act as a tool for monitoring the MS policy. 





A FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING FLEXICURITY (FLC) AND WORK-LIFE-




2.1  Flexicurity as a ‘state of affairs’: a ‘stock-flow-outcome’ approach (SFO)   
 
Following Wilthagen (2005) the concept of flexicurity can be understood as a “state 
of affairs” and as a “policy strategy”. The framework for defining a set of flexicurity 
indicators as developed by the Indicators Group of the EMCO (the Employment 
Committee of the Commission) concerns flexicurity as a “policy strategy” (see 
section 2.2) whereas the ‘stock-flow-outcome’ (SFO) approach, presented here, 
concerns flexicurity as a “state of affairs” where ‘state’ is not a static but a dynamic 
concept referring to stocks as well as to flows and outcomes. The SFO approach is 
believed to be able to act as a useful framework for defining indicators and for 
monitoring the progress in the performance of countries (i.e. the state of affairs). 
The stocks reflect the various forms of human and social capital or capabilities which 
have been build up in the past through investments in education and skill formation, 
work experience, participation in social activities and social networks, and the flows 
the transitions and duration in these states (% of people moving in and out of full-
time or part-time employment or poverty and the duration of stay in these states). 
The outcomes with respect to flexicurity are the attained level of the various types of 
flexibility (numerical, functional) and the various types of security like income, 
employment or work-life balance security. Below we sketch our SFO framework and 
approach in more detail.  
 
A stocks-flows-outcomes approach (SFO) 
In our view the concepts of flexicurity and work-life-balance (WLB) deal with stocks 
(capabilities) and flows (investments, transitions), and are therefore intrinsically 
dynamic. The focus is therefore on changes, short-term and long-term changes over 
a human’s lifetime, people’s life cycle or the life course. These can only be monitored 
and analysed in a dynamic and life course framework. The model to examine the 
situation of flexibility and security and changes therein over time is therefore also 
dynamic. Secondly, it departs from the idea that outcomes deal with various 
dimensions, i.e. economic, social and environmental, contributing to the flexicurity 
balance for people. From a conceptual viewpoint, the ‘input-process-output’ model 
(IPO) as suggested by the EMCO indicators group (2008) reflects the “policy strategy” 
dimension whereas the ‘stock-flow-outcome’ (SFO) approach presented in this 
section reflects the “state of affairs” dimension of flexicurity (see Muffels & Headey, 
2008). It is inspired by the capability approach of Sen and resembles recent work for 
the French Presidency of the European Union by some Nobel laureates concerning 
the measurement of well-being (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009). Capabilities refer to 
the freedoms or opportunities people have to achieve the things in life they have 
reason to value most (e.g. Sen, 1993). These capabilities reflect the ‘free choice’ of 
people and also concern the options people have but never choose for. Hence, 
capabilities are hard to measure and a direct measure will not be readily available.  
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Figure 1: Flexicurity as a ‘States of Affairs’: A Stock-Flow-Outcome (SFO) Approach 
 
Note: LLL=Life-Long-Learning; FCA=Flexible Contractual Agreements; ALMP=Active Labour 
Market Policies; MSS=Modernised Social Security Systems 
 
 
Therefore for measurement purposes an indirect yardstick is used indicating the 
amount of human capital (education, work experience), social capital (contacts, 
social networks), cultural capital (preferences, values, attitudes) people possess and 
environmental capital (healthy lifestyle, green resources) 1 . The flows and 
investments represent the streams of income and consumption as well as the 
functionings (in Sen’s words the doings and beings) people derive from their 
resources and wealth, but also the investments in education and training or in the 
time spent to caring and in maintaining one’s social networks. Outcomes are the 
attainment of a flexible and inclusive labour market with sustainable levels of 
flexibility and security and work-life balance.  
 
The SFO framework as depicted in Figure 2.1 departs from an ‘agency-structure’ 
approach according to which the policy process and the institutions (structure) are 
assumed to affect the social and economic interactions at the individual level 
determining the relationship between the amount of stocks, the flows or investment 
in these stocks and the outcomes with a view to flexicurity and WLB policies. The 
upper part entails ‘agency’ or the decisions of individual agents, whereas the lower 
                                 
1
 In the report of Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009) the capital notion is explicitly mentioned as a way to 
measure economic performance and social progress (well-being).   
Stocks/Capa-
bilities 
- Human capital 
- Social capital 
- Cultural capital 
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part represents the policy or institutional dimension together with the socio-
economic and environmental resources context forming the ‘structure’ part.   
 
The set of indicators to be developed now have to deal for the agency part with 
stocks, flows and outcomes and for the structure part with input, process indicators 
and output indicators. The agency part translates into the so-called ‘Stocks-Flows-
Outcomes’ or SFO-approach (this section) whereas the structure part translates into 
the so-called ‘Efforts-States-Challenges’ or ESC approach (see section 2.2). 
 
Defining indicators using the SFO framework 
The SFO approach has been used to define a broad set of dynamic indicators. In the 
extended ‘flexicurity’ matrix of Wilthagen five forms of flexibility and seven forms of 
security were distinguished (see Annex 1, table A1). That resulted in an extended list 
of dynamic indicators on flexibility and security which are reported in Chung et al., 
(2009). A distinction was made between institutional and static (stocks) and dynamic 
(flows) outcome indicators. The dynamic outcome indicators were further 
distinguished into ‘flows-transition’, measuring yearly changes, and ‘flows-duration’ 
outcome indicators, measuring changes over a longer period of time. In Tables 2.1 
and 2.2 we present a list of institutional and outcome indicators for respectively the 
flexibility and security domain that can be seen as the result of the application of the 
stock-flow-outcome (SFO) approach.  
 
The use of this SFO framework might have implications for the type of indicators to 
be used. With a view to monitoring dynamics, indicators might be added which are 
not restricted to year-to-year transitions from one state into another but which are 
able to monitor the probability of a transition dependent on the residence or 
duration in the origin state. From research it is known that the mobility rates (exit 
and entry rates) are often conditional on the length of the spell (due to duration or 
path dependence). This translates then e.g. into a measure for the probability to 
enter employment conditional on stay in unemployment for one or more years.  
 
One step further than to develop annual transition measures conditional on elapsed 
duration in an origin state would be to define these transition-duration indicators 
over a longer period say the short-term up to 5 years, the medium-term up to 10 
years or the long-term up to more than 20 years but that poses strong demands on 
the data which are not readily available for the 27 EU member states.  
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Table 2.1  Defining various types of ‘flexibility/mobility’ indicators: ‘institutional’, static (stocks) and dynamic (flows) ‘outcome’ indicators 
 
 Institutional indicators Outcome indicators 
 Static Static (stocks)  Dynamic (flows-transitions) Dynamic (flows-duration) 
F1. Numerical, 
internal 
 Laws/regulations on PT 
work 
 Law/regulations on WTA  
 % of workers in PT jobs 
 % of workers in WTA 
 Working hours mobility 
 Working time mobility 
 Duration in part-time spells 
 Duration in WTA  
F2. Numerical, 
external 
 EPL for permanent and 
temporary contracts and 
dismissal procedures 
 Supply of non-standard 
contracts 
 % of labour force in non-
standard jobs by type 
 Contract mobility 
 Mobility from temporary into 
permanent jobs,  
 Duration in contract spell 
F3. Functional, 
internal 
 Opportunities for internal 
functional mobility 
 % of workers changing jobs 
internally 
 % of workers moving upwards 
or downwards on the internal 
occupational ladder  
 Internal job-to-job mobility 
(functional mobility) 
 Duration in internal job spell 
F4. Functional, 
external 
 Labour law/regulations  
 Opportunities for 
employment in these types 
of jobs  
 % of workers in such jobs  Voluntary and involuntary 
external job-to-job mobility 
(employer’s change) 
 Duration in 
voluntary/involuntary 
external job spell 
F5. Wage flexibility  Laws/regulations on 
(minimum) pay 
 Type of pay systems 
 Characteristics of wage 
bargain  
 % of workers in various pay 
systems 
 % coverage of workers in 
wage bargain 




 Average change in 
wage/income for movers 
 Duration in pay system 
 Duration in various 
wage/income brackets (low 
pay; middle pay; high pay) 
* WTA Working time arrangements; PT=Part-time job 
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Table 2.2  Defining various types of transition security indicators: static versus dynamic outcome indicators 
Type of security Description/definition Static indicator  Dynamic indicator (transitions) Dynamic indicator (duration) 
1. Job security   
 
 Security of employment in 
current job 
 % of workers with short and long 
tenure  
 % voluntary/involuntary job-
to-job mobility  
 Average duration of completed 
job spells (job tenure) 
2. Work security   Safe/ Healthy workplace  % serious accidents at work 
 % sickness leave 
 % inflow in serious accidents 
 % inflow in sickness leave   
 Average duration of sickness 
absence due to accidents 
3. Employment 
security 
 Security of employment   Employment/Participation rates 
by age, skill level, sex 
 Unemployment rate by age, skill 
level, sex 
 Weighted % Entry - % Exit 
out of  various employment 
statuses 
 
 Length of intermittent 
unemployment spells 
 % Entry and % Exit (un)-





 Fair/equal pay 
 Safeguarding income against 
social risks 
 Hourly wage or compensation as 
% of  average pay 
 Replacement rates for short and 
long durations of transfer 
dependency 
 % of workers in low-wage and/or 
poverty 
 % Exit and % Entry into low-
wage or poverty 
 % income reduction to 
previous wage (repl. rates) 
 Transitions into and out of 
low-wage  and poverty 
 Stability of wage/income 
(coefficient of variation of 
pay/income over time) 
 Duration of stay in low-wage an 
poverty by employment status 
5. Employability 
security 
 Opportunities to acquire and 
maintain skills 
 % of workers in life-long learning 
or training 
 % worker’s inflow and 
outflow  in LLL or training 
programmes  
 % workers moving into 
permanent employment 
after training 
 Average length of stay in LLL or 
training as % of current tenure 









 Protection of collective voice 
through worker’s 




 % worker/firm’s membership of 
unions/employer’s organisations 
/ % workers/firms covered by 
wage bargain 
 % worker’s/firm’s inflow and 
outflow of membership of 
unions/employers 
organisations 






 Availability of child care relief, 
working time and 
care/education leave options 
(WTO) according to needs 
  
 Number of hours spent to care 
 % of men/women at work and 
working part-time 
 % of men/women stop working 
and reducing hours due to caring 
duties 
 Number of child care relief 
places in firms as % of workers 
 % of workers and firms using 
WTO  
 Change in hours care due to 
childbirth 
 % of inflow/outflow of 
workers using child care 
options 
 % of inflow/outflow in PT 
work due to child care 
 % of inflow/outflow of 
workers and firms using WTO 
 Average duration of care-giving   
 Average duration of use of child 
care relief places 
 Average duration of use of WTO 
 Average duration of spells of 
non-work and hours reduction 
in working time due to child-
care  
Source: For the definition part (first two columns) reworked from Standing, 1999; Wilthagen; 1998; 2004, own additions  
 
 
The OECD for instance calculates theoretical replacement rates for people moving from paid 
employment into short-term unemployment, or into longer-term unemployment (for a 
maximum of 5 years) with or without inclusion of social assistance benefits. They are 
however not based on real micro-level data but on simulations derived from the official 
benefit regulations. One might however also use real micro-level data derived from e.g. SILC 
to calculate replacement rates from the wage and income information provided in the data. 
However, SILC permits this for the short term only since SILC as a rotating panel has a short 
time horizon of four years only.  
 
From a life course perspective states are considered to constitute a series of sequences over 
the life-course and since people combine different states (e.g. work and care or work and 
education) at the same time in each stage of the life course, the life course can be 
represented by sequences of state combinations. A further broadening of the set of dynamic 
indicators therefore deals with the inclusion of so-called lifecycle or life course (input and 
process) indicators, measuring the access to and take-up of options people have over their 
life course to combine different types of activities during the various stages. Defining output 
indicators for the work-life balance therefore also entails defining indicators for the 
transitions between various state combinations. The challenge will be to define a list of state 
and flow indicators bringing the work-life balance into picture but which are easy to 
understand and to use.   
 
On request of the Commission the focus has been on defining dynamic outcome and in 
particular transition indicators for the domains of Flexible Contractual Arrangements (FLCA) 
and Modern Social Security Systems (MSS), in particular concerning income security and the 
work-life balance which are not yet worked out by the EMCO indicators group. However, 
because flexicurity policies concern all four domains and the aim is to elaborate a 
methodology for monitoring we decided to define also transition outcome indicators for the 
other two domains of Life Long Learning (LLL) and active labour market policies (ALMP) using 
our micro-level data.  In chapter 4, we elaborate a set of feasible indicators on all four 
domains using the SILC data for 2003-2006/2007.  
 
 
2.2 Flexicurity As A Policy Strategy: The  Effort-State-Challenges Approach (ESC) 
 
In 2.1 we already explained our ‘stock, flow, outcome’ (SFO) model acting as a heuristic 
device to identify indicators on flexicurity and work-life-balance as a “state of affairs”. In this 
section we explain how we can identify “flexicurity as a policy strategy”. A special emphasis 
is given to the type of indicators needed to monitor the effects and progress of Member 
States’ policies on flexicurity and WLB outcomes. We first review the framework developed 
by the EMCO indicators group which is developed to be used for monitoring of flexicurity “as 
a policy strategy”. After that we explain the ESC approach and compare this approach to the 
EMCO indicators group’s framework. Lastly, we show how the ESC approach could be used 
to monitor the member states policies and practices on the EU flexicurity guidelines and 





2.2.1 Existing and proposed indicators by EMCO  
 
In the first progress report of the Indicators Group of EMCO of 2007 a framework for 
defining indicators on these eight guidelines has been developed (EMCO, 2007). The 
framework is also used in the final 2009 report (EMCO, 2009) where the EMCO indicators 
group made a valuable attempt to define indicators on all these guidelines and to map out 
countries using the methodology of radar charts on the four policy domains from the scores 
on the various indicators in each domain.  
The EMCO framework is designed for the purpose of policy evaluation and 
distinguishes between input -including institutional, or policy oriented indicators-, process 
indicators showing how many people are subject to policy interventions and output or 
outcome indicators aimed at monitoring the performance of member states on the 
interventions. Following Wilthagen (2005) the concept of flexicurity can be understood as a 
“state of affairs” and as a “policy strategy”. The EMCO framework concerns flexicurity as a 
“policy strategy” whereas the ‘stock-flow-outcome’ (SFO) approach, presented in 2.3, 
concerns flexicurity as a “state of affairs”. In Table 2 we list the indicators as they are 
developed in the course of time in the EES. We include also the proposed indicators as they 
are formulated in the final EMCO-Indicators Group report of 2009 to supplement the EES 
indicators. The official and key EES indicators are in bold. Each indicator refers to a number-
letter combination as defined in the official classification of the EES guidelines included in 
Annex 3. Viewing the set of EES indicators and the suggested EMCO-Indicators Group 
indicators in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, a number of observations can be made: 
  Increasingly so the EES system contains dynamic indicators measuring the rate of 
transition from one state into another on the labour market whereas in the past the majority 
of these indicators was static. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 mention a number of dynamic transition 
indicators such as the transitions by employment contract (permanent, temporary, part-
time), labour status (employment, unemployment) and pay level. The EMCO Indicators 
Group proposes to further extend the list of dynamic EES indicators to consider a wider 
range of transitions such as between work and various forms of non-work activities, 
between jobs of different quality, and especially between different combinations of work 
and non-work activities such as caring and life long learning.  
 The institutional or input indicators as defined by the EMCO Indicators Group should 
not only deal with the availability of policy measures or how many people have access to a 
particular measure or arrangement but also with the take-up rate.  Some of the proposed 
(process) indicators indeed aim to look at the take-up rate, i.e. the fraction of all people in 
the risk group that is entitled to the arrangement and that has actually used it. 
 The EMCO report discusses the idea of a composite indicator for all four domains that 
it considers less appropriate for the purpose of monitoring due to the inherent difficulty of 
interpretation. Composite indicators have the disadvantage that apart from the 
interpretation problem, the normalisation method (to be able to compare the outcomes 
across different settings) and the weighting scheme implied, involve rather arbitrary choices 
(OECD/JRC, 2008). On the other hand composite indicators, e.g. on job quality, have the 
advantage to provide comprehensive summary indicators on the relative performance of 
countries on a particular domain which is particularly useful for analytical purposes (e.g. for 
multivariate analyses) when the number of countries (e.g. EU27) is limited. Radar charts as 
proposed by the EMCO Indicators Group have the advantage to provide a more detailed 
picture of the country’s performance on each single underlying dimension making them very 
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useful for showing the MS policy performance on each domain but are difficult to use when 
the list of indicators to be measured and monitored is large such as in the case of modern 
social security systems or job quality (see annex A2.1).     
 The EES indicators defined so far focus more on numerical external flexibility and 
security and, less so on numerical internal or functional internal flexibility and security. The 
EMCO indicators group acknowledges this gap and therefore suggests the development of 
indicators on working time arrangements and on work organisation and job quality.  
In the final report EMCO proposes two indicators in the first step, one dealing with 
employment security associated with transitions between employment contract statuses 
from one year to the next and one with employability security and life long learning 
transitions within employment combined with pay decile changes. The idea is to calculate 
the proportions of people staying, moving upwards or downwards in terms of employment 
and pay level security (see Table 2.2). 
 The EMCO group used the IPO (input-process-output) model to arrive at these 
indicators but was aware of one drawback, that is that outcomes in terms of flexibility and 
security (state of affairs) are not only associated with the impact of policies but also with the 
impact of ‘agency’ and individual behaviour in society and with the broader socio-
economic/cultural/environmental context. The causal effects of policies are therefore hard 
to disentangle from the agency and contextual effects. The efforts-states-challenges 
approach that is explained in 2.2.2 is meant to deal with that problem, at least partially.  
 
 
Table 2.3: EES indicators and indicators proposed by the EMCO-Indicators Group (2008, 
2009) 
  
 Input indicator Process indicator Output indicator  
FCA-Flexible, contractual arrangements   
 EES  Access to flexitime 
21.A4 
 Diversity and reasons for 
contractual and working 
arrangements 21.M2  
 Employees with overtime 
work 21.A3 
 Transitions by type of 
contract 21.M1 
 Over-time hours 21.A3 
 EMCO   OECD’s Index of 
strictness of EPL 
 Including wage bargain 
indicators in EPL 









 Transitions by type of contract 
 Frequency of persons with at 
least the same employment 
security as previous year 
LLL-Life long learning   
EES  Public spending on 
human resources 
23.M1 
 Investment by 
enterprises in training 
of adults 23.A1 
 Lifelong learning (age 25-
64) 23.M4 
 Participation in continuous 
vocational training, 23.A2 
 Transitions (labour status, pay 
level) 17.A4 &18.A8  
 Educational attainment of 
adults 23.A3 
 E-skills  24.A2 
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     (Table 2.3. continued)    
EMCO  Access rules to LLL, 
rules for ‘second 
chance’ 
education/training 
 Improved participation 
measures in LLL/CVT 
  
Active LMP    
 EES  Expenditure on LMP-
measures per person 
wanting to work 19.A6  
 Expenditure on LMP-
measures as % of GDP 
19.A5 
 Activation/Support 
(regular and assisted 
activation) 19.M2 
 New start/Prevention 
19.M3 
 Activation of registered 
unemployed 19.A3 
 Follow up of participants in 
regular activation measures 
19.A4 
 Public Employment Services 
(PES) follow-  up indicator on 
training measures 
 EMCO Idem Idem Idem 
MSS-Modern social security systems   
 EES  LMP expenditure on 
supports per person 
wanting to work 19.A8 
 LMP expenditure on 
supports as % of GDP 
19.A7 
 Unemployment trap 
19.M7 





 At-risk of poverty of the 
unemployed. SPC SI-S1c 
 
 
 EMCO   Access rules to benefits 
 
 Coverage of certain 
benefits for persons in 
atypical contracts  
 In-work  poverty risk by type 
of contract  
 Dynamic measure for 
transitions from work to 
inactivity 
 
Reconciliation work-private life   
 EES  Child care 18.M3 
  Care of dependant 
elderly 18.A7 (access to 
care arrangements for 
children and 
dependent elderly) 
 Inactivity trap after 
child care cost (lone 
parent with children) 
SPC-OV 9b 
 Employment impact of 
parenthood 18.A5 
(Employment rates for 
women and men without 
and with young children) 
 Lack of care for children and 
other dependents 18.A6 
(Share of persons who do not 
work or who work less 
because of lack of suitable 
care facilities). 
 Drop in theoretical 
replacement rates due to 
career interruptions. SPC. PN 
P4. 
 EMCO  Life-cycle arrangements   Workers combining 
parenthood and work 
  Workers combining partial 
retirement and work 
 
Note: The numbers and letter combinations of each indicator refer to the guideline number and the indicators 
for monitoring (M) or analysis (A) as listed in table A2.3 in Annex 2. 
Source: Derived from EMCO Progress Report, 2008 and EMCO Final Report, 2009  
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2.2.2 The ‘Efforts-States-Challenges’ (ESC) approach 
 
The ESC approach could be understood as an extended version of the input-process-output 
model used by EMCO. The EMCO model is similar to the elements of the notions of the 
policy chain or policy cycle, concepts that are being used frequently in many policy 
evaluation studies (Spicker, 2006; Castonguay, 2009). Unlike the EMCO model, Castonguay’s 
(2009) model consists of input, process, output, as well as impact.  As we can see here, 
output and impact is distinguished: output is the direct product of the programme whereas 
impact is the effect of policies on the participants and their positions. The model also defines 
external factors outside the authority of the policy maker affecting the policy chain such as 
macro-economic (e.g. credit crunch), political (parties in power), juridical and geographical 
contextual factors including regional disparities in labour market conditions. The model is 
not causal, it enumerates the elements of the policy chain that need to be addressed in 
defining flexicurity indicators for monitoring policies in this domain. 
 




Source: Castonguay, 2009 
 
Based on these elements, the distinction is made between efforts, states, and effects to 
capture the various stages at which flexicurity policies can be measured. The input and 
process part translate into an ‘institutional and policy efforts’ part with a view to the role of 
institutions and policies. Institutional and policy efforts can be examined through viewing  
practices of all relevant actors to enhance flexibility and security in a country. This includes 
arrangements and institutions as embedded in laws (e.g. Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL); regulation of minimum wage; regulation of part-time work) and policies but also 
practices of various actors at various levels such as companies (working time and holiday 
arrangements).  
The second phase in the policy chain concerns the results of these efforts (equivalent to 
‘output’ in Castongay’s framework) which relates to the actual state of flexibility and 
security, using the extended matrix in Table 1.1. This entails the assessment of how flexible 
and how secure individuals and companies are in a particular country.   
 
The challenges/effects in our framework are equivalent to the ‘impact’ stage in the policy 
chain framework. Here the challenges are not the direct or sole outcomes of the flexicurity 
efforts, but pertain to the indirect outcomes or wider impact mediated through policies, the 
national context and external factors such as those raised by low fertility rates or adverse 
economic shocks (such as the credit crunch). This model is similar to the ‘EMCO indicators-
group’ input-process-output model, though reformulated to reflect the dynamics of policy 
formulation more explicit in the policy chain approach.  It also takes account of the impact of 
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path dependency in the policy learning process. Policies may tend to change incrementally 
due to the fundamental inertia in the institutional/organizational context, which is 
considered to be strongly path dependent.  
 
Figure 2.4: Flexicurity as a Policy Strategy: the Efforts-States-Challenges (ESC) Approach 
 
 
The relationship of the various stages is as follows. Efforts made with a view to 
flexicurity/WLB will lead to outcomes or effects that impact the state of flexicurity which will 
subsequently pose challenges to the member states. These challenges of the welfare state 
along with past institutional characteristics induce new efforts, which are responses and 
policy strategies to meet the challenges of a country. The new efforts then result in a move 
from state A to a new state B.  
 
Levels of implementation 
In addition, in the ESC approach, various levels of implementation are considered. Flexicurity 
policies can be observed within national as well as international governance systems, but 
they can also emerge at the sector and company level (Wilthagen, 1998; Klammer and 
Tillman 2001; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). Wilthagen and Tros emphasise the need for a 
multi-level approach because “although policies and strategies may appear to have primarily 
locus at the national, local or sector level, the interplay between other levels of regulation 
and policy making- the European national and company level- will be crucial to their actual 
design, support and implementation.” (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; 183). Thus, we can identify 
five levels in which flexicurity policies can take place: the EU, country, sector or region, 
company and the individual level. Firstly, there is the supranational level, where regulations 
are implemented through European Union Directives, such as the Working Time Directive, 
and through the open method of coordination (OMC), as in the European Employment 
Strategy (EES). Secondly, there is the national level, where flexicurity is implemented via 
universal application of statutory legislation, such as labour laws and other related social 
security laws and policies. Thirdly, there is the branch or industry level at which regulations 
are implemented through collective bargaining applying to a range of firms or sectors. 
Fourthly, there is the company level, where regulations are implemented through corporate 
policies and both formal and informal bargaining between the individual employer and 
employees. The fifth and final level is the individual level, which includes the take up of 
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particular arrangements by an individual. The practices at the individual level materialise 
when the individual makes efforts to enhance their own flexibility or security, or when he or 
she actually decides to take up a certain flexibility or security arrangement. Admittedly, this 
take up is not always voluntary and can also be enforced by the company.  
 





Different outcomes will be observed dependent on the scope of levels that are included in 
the analysis. For example company levels are important in the analysis of flexicurity, since, 
companies might not behave according to the legal or collective agreements made at the 
sector level. Companies might follow their own flexicurity strategy and might act rather 
autonomously from their institutional contexts (see Chung, forthcoming; Bredgaard and 
Tros, 2008).  Although we can measure the flexibility state of a sector/region, country, or 
Europe as a whole, it requires aggregation of the behaviour of individuals and companies.  
 
   
2.3. ESC and the monitoring of MS reporting on Flexicurity policies 
 
One of the principal goals of this study is to develop a methodology for the monitoring of MS 
policies on FLC/WLB. We believe that the ESC framework might be a valuable tool to monitor 
the MS’s reporting exercises.  The focus is on the developing a checklist of questions for 
monitoring the MS’s reporting on Flexicurity policies. In Chapter 5 we will explain our 













3.1 Institutional and outcome indicators used in the EIE reports 
 
In the 2006 Employment in Europe (EIE) report, the first attempts were made by the 
Commission to map out the countries according to flexicurity indicators. The indicators used 
were the EPL index, the percentage of adults in LLL, the expenditures on labour market 
policies in percent of GDP and the average tax wedge. Three latent factors were derived 
from the analysis on the set of indicators, which were named the security (high loading LLL 
and LMP spending), the flexibility (high negative loading of EPL, high loading of LLL) and the 
tax distortions (high loading of the tax wedge) factor. The countries were mapped out as in 
Figure 13. The results show five distinct country clusters: the Continental (AT, BE, DE, FR), 
the Eastern (CZ, HU, IT, PO, SK), the Nordic (DK, FI, NL, SE), the Mediterranean (EL, PT, ES) 
and the Anglo-Saxon (IE, UK).  
 
Figure 3.1. Country grouping according to the European Commission in Employment in 
Europe Report 2006  
 
 




The Anglo-Saxon cluster shows a high degree of flexibility and a relatively low security with 
low taxation. The Continental group show intermediate to low flexibility, intermediate to 
high security, and intermediate to high taxation. The Mediterranean group shows low 
flexibility, relatively low security and no patterns on taxation, whereas the Eastern with Italy, 
shows insecurity, intermediate to high flexibility, and intermediate to high taxation. Lastly, 
the Nordic group, with the Netherlands included, can be considered the flexicurity group, 
with high security, intermediate to high flexibility, and intermediate to high taxation (EC, 
2006). 
In addition to the 2006 EIE report new evidence was published in the 2007 EIE report. 
However, this time the focus has been on internal flexibility, that is, working time and 
internal functional flexibility. They used information from the 2005 European Working 
Condition’s Survey to construct indices of internal flexibility. Using these indices plus the set 
of indicators used in the previous report but excluding the tax wedge, they arrived at three 
components of flexicurity. The first component was named ‘advanced forms of internal 
flexibility and security’ which had high loadings of the flexible working time arrangements, 
the work autonomy and the task complexity, the level of LMP spending and the participation 
in LLL or education. The second component was named the ‘external flexibility’ component, 
with high positive loadings of the work intensity and working on irregular working times 
indicated by the so-called irregularity (WII) index and with high negative loadings of the EPL 
index. Lastly, they mentioned the ‘basic forms of functional flexibility’ component, which is 
also positively correlated to irregular working times, job rotation and team work. The 
country groupings derived from these components were similar to the outcomes of the EIE 
2006 report, although there were slight changes in the Southern and Eastern European 
clusters. Firstly, there is the Continental group (AT, BE, DE, FR) with intermediate to high 
levels of internal flexibility and security, while having relatively low levels of external 
flexibility and intermediate to low levels of functional flexibility. Secondly, the Eastern 
transition group (BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, PO, SK, SI) along with Greece (EL) with low levels of 
internal flexibility and security, and medium but spread levels of external flexibility,  and 
intermediate to high levels of functional flexibility, with the exception of Hungary which 
shows low levels of functional flexibility. Thirdly, the Nordic country group (DK, FI, SE) with 
the Netherlands (NL) showing high levels of internal flexibility and security and intermediate 
levels of both, external flexibility and functional flexibility.  
 
The Mediterranean group (ES, IT, PT) shows low levels of internal flexibility and security, 
intermediate (IT) to low (PT) levels of external flexibility, and low levels of functional 
flexibility. Lastly, the Anglo-Saxon group (IE, UK) shows intermediate levels of internal 
flexibility and security, high levels of external flexibility, and rather low levels of functional 
















Source: European Commission 2007a (Chapter 3, Chart 64) 
 
 
Mapping countries through using radar charts: the EMCO Indicators Group  
Another way of mapping countries is through using radar charts which allows visualising the 
scores of countries on different domains of flexicurity and work-life balance policies 
compared to a benchmark. An example for the Netherlands is given below. The information 













Figure 3.3.1: Radar charts on flexicurity input indicators, figures for the Netherlands  





Figure 3.3.2: Radar charts on flexicurity process indicators, figures for the Netherlands  











The benchmark can be the best performing country on each separate domain or the average 
score for EU15 or EU27. In their 2009 final report the EMCO Indicators Group presented 
these radar charts to map out the countries on how they perform on a set of four input and 
four process indicators.  The results for one country, here the Netherlands, are presented in 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The input indicators considered in this charts are: access to flexitime (in 
2004), expenditure on passive LMP, i.e.  unemployment benefits in 2005 and 2006 in 
purchasing power parities per person wanting to work, expenditures on active labour market 
policies and public spending on human resources policies (life long learning) as a percentage 
of GDP. The process indicators are: the number of unemployment benefit recipients per 100 
persons wanting to work, the percentage of employees working in a permanent or voluntary 
part-time or fixed-term contract showing the proportion of employees in “good” contracts, 
the percentage of the adult population in education and training, and the number of old 
persons in regular activation measures (training, employment incentives etc.) per 100 
persons wanting to work.  
 
The radar charts are calculated using a common scale for all countries for which reason it is 
possible to indicate the EU27 average in the graphs by the letter E. Generally, a point further 
from the origin represents a higher score on each indicator.  The chart further shows the 
changes between 2005 and 2006, which are rather small for the Netherlands. The number of 
unemployment beneficiaries as well as the number of persons in activation measures is 
decreasing due to a favourable economic situation. The chart also shows that the 
Netherlands is performing best on active and passive labour market policies. In addition, the 
Netherlands is performing quite well in terms of investments in life long learning and 
education and training as well. However, it performs less favourable in terms of flexitime 
arrangements.  
 
3.2.  Composite institutional indicators 
The analyses and mapping of countries in the various EIE reports were based on a large set 
of single indicators on various domains but also on factor and component scores combining 
a variety of indicators with high loadings on each component. To understand the structure of 
the data better multivariate analyses and in particular data reduction techniques have been 
employed such as factor and principal components analysis (PCA) on indicators and cluster 
analyses on countries. Their purpose is to reduce the dimensionality of the data without 
loosing relevant information. They allow clustering indicators into one or more underlying 
latent factors or components and countries into several policy or regime types. The type of 
indicators loading high on a particular factor or component reveals what latent theoretical 
construct or concept is measured by the combination of these indicators. The factors or 
components represent therefore composite indicators for the latent concept that it seems to 
measure.  In the second step cluster analysis is then used to cluster countries based on these 
factor or component scores. The use of these multivariate analysis techniques is just one 
though an important one of the ten steps distinguished in the literature to construct 
composite indicators (1.theoretical framework; 2. variable selection; 3. imputation of 
missing data; 4. multivariate analysis; 5. normalization; 6. weighting and aggregation; 7. 
uncertainty and sensitivity analysis; 8. back to the data; 9. Links to other indicators; 10. 
visualisation of the results). The composite indicator (CI) methodology is developed jointly 
 
23 
by the OECD and the JRC and explained very clearly in their 2008 OECD/JRC report (see 
Nardo et al., 2008).   
 
Construction of composite indicators 
The CI method has already been applied to construct for three of the four domains 
composite indicators, not yet for flexible contractual arrangements, but for life-long 
learning, active labour market policies and modern social security systems. On ALMP 16 
single indicators derived from Eurostat’s Labour Market policy Database were selected to 
construct a composite indicator on active labour market policies for 2004 to 2007. The 
Netherlands scored very well but not very robustly across the various indicators and for 
these years between the second and fourth ranking position confirming the evidence 
presented before in the radar charts (cf. Mascherini & Manca, 2009). Also for life long 
learning a composite indicator was calculated based on 9 indicators though for one year only 
(2005). Again it turns out that the Netherlands perform very well with the fifth rank and best 
performance on the indicator measuring the proportion of companies providing continuous 
vocational training courses (Mascherini, 2008). Also on the third domain of Modern Social 
Security Systems a composite indicator based on 20 indicators was composed showing 
intermediate-to-upper scores for the Netherlands, ranking 11th in 2005, 12th in 2006 and 
6th in 2007 whereas Denmark, Portugal and Belgium reach the highest scores in 2005 and 
2006 and Belgium, Spain and Portugal in 2007 (Governatori, Manca and Mascherini, 2009). 
The indicators used were all static institutional indicators though measured for one or more 
years, measuring the policy input (e.g. GDP spending) or the policy process (participation in 
training) according to the framework of EMCO. The approach is useful to see the rankings of 
country's policy efforts and changes in the rankings over time or its variability based on a set 
of existing policy indicators. 
 
Relation to ESC approach 
The focus in the CI approach is on policy efforts and not on states or outcomes and 
challenges as in the ESC approach. Outcome indicators are not only associated with policy 
efforts but also with the broader socio-economic context. It means that these indicators 
capture only the efforts part of flexicurity seen as a policy strategy but not the states or 
outcomes and challenges part (that arises by confronting efforts and outcomes), as in our 
Efforts-States-Challenges or ESC approach.  
 
Relation to SFO approach 
The CI approach uses mainly static (policy) indicators but not dynamic indicators based on 
information on changes, transitions and flows. The CI approach departs from using 
composite indicators whereas the SFO approach has no a priori preference for using single 
or composite indicators. Both might be useful dependent on the sort of information that is 
needed for assessing the performance of countries on the various EES dimensions. For 
monitoring single EES guidelines single indicators might do well whereas for combinations of 
EES guidelines composite indicators are possibly needed.  A further difference is associated 
with the use of the indicators for analytical purposes. The CI approach is useful for mapping 
countries on the various dimensions of policies but cannot explain why countries perform as 
they do in terms of outcomes since it is based on correlations only. The SFO model on the 
other hand can use the single or composite institutional indicators as explanatory factors in 
the models for explaining the variation across countries in outcomes indicated by the 
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transition indicators. For that reason, for analytical purposes the CI approach is extremely 
useful to include the composite indicators in the models on transition outcomes. With a 
limited number of countries the number of indicators that can be included is rather limited 
because of which the use of a composite indicator is a good alternative compared to using 
large number of single indicators. For that reason the ESC/SFO approach is not a substitute 
for what the CI approach is pursuing but complements it for monitoring as well as for 
analytical purposes.  
 
 
3.3 Dynamic indicators on flexibility and security  
 
In 2008, the European Foundation further issued a publication titled: “Flexibility and security 
over the life course” (Muffels et al., 2008). It aims at developing institutional as well as 
outcome indicators and static as well as dynamic indicators on labour market mobility and 
employment security. The institutional indicators were similar to other studies but the 
outcome indicators were defined rather differently.  
Departing from the flexicurity matrix of Wilthagen the focus was in particular on defining 
indicators for numerical (external and internal) flexibility, mainly dealing with temporary and 
part-time work, and for income, employment and combination security. The study used the 
transition indicators on mobility and security that were elaborated in a previous study 
(Muffels and Luijkx, 2006) which allow assessing changes on the flexibility-security balance 
of countries over time. A distinction was made between institutional and context indicators, 
and between static and dynamic outcome indicators. The indicators were further 
distinguished into short-term and long-term indicators referring to the length of the 
observation period. These measures were subsequently applied using the evidence from the 
European Community Household Panel and the European Foundation’s surveys (adding 
information on working time flexibility) to map out the countries. The measures itself are 
explained in more detail below. 
 
The flexibility and security measures explained  
The dynamic indicators for flexibility deal with the levels of occupational and contract 
mobility and were based on the in -and outflows, indicated by the annual transition rates, 
between the various occupational statuses (see for a detailed explanation Muffels and Luijkx, 
2008). The indicators for dynamic employment security were based on the in –and outflows 
or transition rates between the various employment statuses (employed, non-employed) 
and between employment contracts (an open-ended contract, a temporary contract, a self-
employed job). Transitions between employment statuses were classified as secure or 
insecure assuming that exit from the labour market is a transition into an insecure 
employment status and entry into a job a transition into a more secure status. Those who 
stayed employed were considered more secure (entry) and those staying unemployed or 
inactive more insecure (exit). The gain or loss of security for transitions between the various 
contracts was based on the average subjective assessment of the level of security for each 







Definition and calculation of four dynamic indicators  
Four dynamic outcome indicators were defined: 
– Occupational mobility (OM) 
– Contract mobility (CM) 
– Dynamic Employment security (ESD) 
– Dynamic Income security (YSD). 
 
Occupational mobility (OM) is the mobility to a higher or a lower occupational class 
according to the EGP classification scheme of occupations (see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1992). The panel data used (ECHP) only provide information on occupational class consisting 
of four categories instead of the original eleven. We use it as a proxy for job mobility as it 
underestimates the level of job mobility since the mobility of people into another job while 
staying in the same occupational class (lateral mobility) is not taking into account due to lack 
of information on job change.   
Contract mobility (CM), the second measure, refers to the mobility between different types 
of contracts (permanent and temporary job, self-employment). Using the information on the 
transitions between origin and destination contract status across two years the number of 
workers moving from one of these contract types into another can be calculated. 
Occupational and contract mobility are treated as separate outcome indicators for the level 
of flexibility in a country. We will not go into detail here how the measured were calculated. 
We refer to Muffels and Luijkx for a detailed treatment. With respect to security a measure 
for dynamic employment security (ESD) has been defined. In later work (Muffels and Luijkx, 
2008b) a similar measure for dynamic income security (YSD)2 has been developed as well in 
which poverty is defined according to the 60% EC’s poverty threshold.   
Dynamic employment security (ESD) at the individual level is measured by changes in 
employment security due to changes in the employment status of a person. If a person 
during two consecutive years enters a permanent job or self-employment from either non-
work (unemployment or inactivity) or from a flexible contract, his employment security is 
increased (entry) and if he leaves a permanent job and moves into a flexible contract, self-
employment or into non-work his employment security is reduced (exit). The transition rates 
between the various statuses are next summed up and weighted with the shares of each 
employment state. 
Dynamic income security (YSD) is similarly defined as the change in income security across 
two years. Income security is improved if people stay out of poverty or escape from it across 
two years (entry security) and income security is reduced if people stay in poverty or enter it 
and become poor (exit security). Again the transition rates are weighted with the shares of 
each state. 
 
The indicators for mobility/flexibility and dynamic employment and income security were 
then used to map out the countries. The outcomes of this analysis will not be given here but 
in Chapter 4 we will report on the definition of these indicators as well as on the calculation 
of other dynamic indicators using the SILC data for 2005-2006. The findings on the outcome 
indicators using the ECHP data showed however that the Nordic and the Anglo-Saxon 
                                 
2
 In the report for the European Foundation the ESD indicator was calculated leaving out the transitions from 
self-employment into employment or non-work whereas in the later publication the self-employed were again 
included producing somewhat different results for a few countries. The figures presented in the graphs are based 
on the latest figures derived from Muffels and Luijkx, 2008b. 
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countries perform almost equally well with a view to combining a high mobility and a high 
income and employment security. 
 
3.4    Institutional versus outcome indicators 
One conclusion concerning the use of institutional and outcome indicators is that 
institutional indicators for flexibility indicated by e.g. the EPL indices or Labour Market Policy 
indicators tell only the regulatory part of the story but not how regulations work out in 
practice after economic and social interactions have impacted the outcomes. The underlying 
reason is that actors might not behave in accordance to the norms or regulations and 
therefore cause unexpected outcomes. For that reason institutional indicators need to be 
supplemented with outcome indicators to obtain information on the attained level of 
mobility or flexibility in a country. Figure 3.3.2 shows the negative relationship between EPL 
strictness for regular jobs and the job mobility rates for people in permanent contracts 
though the relationship as indicated by the regression line is far from perfect. If the 
relationship would be perfect all countries would be on the line MP. Many countries are 
situated above or below this line meaning that they exhibit much higher or lower mobility 
rates than correspond to the level of their EPL strictness such as Ireland, Denmark, Austria 
and Poland (lower mobility) and Norway, Sweden and Spain (higher mobility).  The high 
mobility in Spain must be attributed to a high level of contract mobility, the mobility 
between temporary contract on the one side and permanent contracts and self- 
employment on the other.    
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FLEXICURITY AS A ‘STATE OF AFFAIRS’: MONITORING THE 








4.1 Indicators for monitoring   
 
The idea is to apply a limited set of flexicurity indicators and to map the countries using 
these indicators. The proposal made by the EMCO indicators group (see Table 2.2 on page 
15) for indicators act as a point of reference but which methodology we will try to elaborate 
further also with a view to the distinction between single and composite measures. We first 
define and calculate some dynamic transition indicators on the two domains of Flexible and 
Reliable Contractual Arrangements (FLCA) and on Modern Social Security Systems (MSS) 
including Work-Life Balance security (WLB) to which our main interest go. They aim to 
measure the level of flexibility or mobility on the LM on the one hand and the level of 
income and employment security and combination or work-life balance security on the 
other. In the second step we also define some dynamic outcome indicators on the domains 
of life-long learning and active labour market policies. We mainly use the longitudinal SILC 
data for 2003-2006. For some indicators we also used the 2003-2007data. 
 
Flexible and Contractual Arrangements:  
A. Flexibility-mobility indicators  
- transitions between occupational statuses (occupational mobility) and between jobs 
(job mobility) 
- transitions between contract statuses (contract mobility)  
- transitions between wage levels (wage mobility)  
 
B. Employment security indicators 
- transitions between different statuses of “employment security” to show the 
differences across countries in the way they achieve transition employment security 
(see e.g. the EMCO-IG indicator for employment security) 
- transitions between different working time patterns (part-time; fulltime) 
 
Life-long Learning (LLL) and Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) 
- transitions by employment status and pay level (see EMCO-IG indicator) 
- transitions into permanent and temporary jobs after participation in education or 
training courses 
- transitions between unemployment and employment statuses (job gain/re-entry, job 
loss/exit) 
- the probability to re-enter employment conditional on the length of stay in 
unemployment (based on monthly status information in SILC) for different social 
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groups (using the calendar information for 2005-2006) being a duration measure of 
transition employment security 
 
Modern Social Security Systems: Transition income security 
- upward or downward income transitions, transitions in low-wage mobility and 
transitions in income security (moving in and out of income poverty) indicating 
transition income security (the YSD measure explained in chapter 3).   
 
Combination security or Work-life balance security 
– % of women in employment and working time arrangements disaggregated by life-
course stage (from being at school, forming a family, empty nest to retirement)  
– % of persons in work-care combinations for different types of households  
– transitions between work-care combinations across two years aimed at defining a 
measure for WLB transition security using the SILC data.  
– time spent to work and caring duties for different families and work-care 
combinations using the available comparative time-use information also aimed at  
defining an indicator for WLB security but now using detailed information on the 
time or hours spent each week to work and care being unavailable in SILC.   
 
 
4.2. Developing and testing transition indicators using SILC  
 
In this section we use the longitudinal data sets of SILC to develop a set of transition 
indicators as explained before on flexible and contractual arrangements, life-long learning, 
active labour market policies and modern social security systems including work-life balance. 
Before we report on these new indicators we first discuss the transition measures defined by 
the EMCO indicators group in their final report (EMCO, 2009). 
 
4.2.1. EMCO indicators and amendments 
 
The EMCO indicators are the following (the number refers to the guideline and the 
monitoring indicators):  
 
1. Transitions by type of contract (21.M1) acting as the output indicator for the policy 
component flexible and contractual arrangements including working time arrangements.  
2. Transitions by employment status and pay level within employment acting as the output 
indicator for the policy component life long learning systems.  
 
Ad 1: Type of contract 
The first one is based on the matrix of contract statuses at t cross-tabulated with the 
contract statuses at t+1. To each cell of the matrix a positive, negative or equal sign is 
assigned showing whether in the view of the EMCO Indicators Group the cell represents an 
upward, downward or lateral transition into a higher, lower or equal level of employment 
security. The signs assigned to each cell depend on the relative ranking of each of the various 
contract statuses with a view to the level of employment security. The ranks implicitly 
assigned to each category for employment security (ES) by the EMCO group are presented in 
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the second panel showing that a higher score of employment security is assigned to statuses 
of fulltime training and education (studies) than to statuses as unemployment or inactivity. 
From a policy point of view the rationale for this seems obvious since the notion of 
flexicurity hinges strongly on the assumption that investing in the employability of people by 
allowing them to follow education and training courses might be a better way of assuring the 
employment chances of people at risk of unemployment than to render them a generous 
benefit. 
 
Table 4.1: Transitions in employment security from year t to t+1 by type of contract 
  EMCO-IG Perm SE Temp Une Stud Ret Inact 
Rank ES 1 2 2 4 3 5 5 
Perm 1= 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- 7- 
SE 8+- 9= 10= 11- 12- 13- 14- 
Temp 15+ 16= 17= 18- 19- 20- 21- 
Une 22+ 23+ 24+ 25- 26+ 27- 28- 
Stud 29+ 30+ 31+ 32- 33= 34- 35- 
Ret 36+ 37+ 38+ 39+ 40+ 41= 42= 
Inact 43+ 44+ 45+ 46+ 47+ 48- 49= 
Note: Perm=Permanent contract; SE=Self-Employment including family workers, Temp=Temporary Contract; 
Une=Unemployment, Stud=Studies, i.e. Education, Training; Ret=Retirement; Inact=Inactivity.  
Source: Derived from EMCO-IG (2009), own additions 
 
 
From an analytical perspective one might question whether in terms of output or outcomes 
a transition from unemployment to studies necessarily involves an improvement in 
employment security since people especially in economic recessions often opt for studies 
due to lack of employment opportunities. Furthermore, since studying takes time, the 
availability for the labour market during the time of study is reduced and the distance to the 
labour market increased at least for the short-term.   
The Table also shows that transitions from self-employment to temporary contracts 
and vice versa are assumed to render the same level of employment security and that 
staying in unemployment is assumed to worsen employment security. For both assumptions 
the rationale seems clear. For the latter, there is rather strong empirical evidence that 
staying longer in unemployment reduces the chances to re-enter employment, which is 
known in the labour market literature as negative duration dependency. For the first, people 
in small self-employment businesses are just as temporary employed often in a very insecure 
employment situation while being dependent on a strongly fluctuating market.  However, to 
assume that a transition into self-employment is as insecure or secure as a transition into a 
temporary job seems a strong assumption asking at least for more scrutiny into the issue 
through empirical research.  
 
Objective and subjective security scores 
Another way of assigning scores to each of the transitions in the contract status matrix 
would be to ask people about how secure they judge particular jobs or contracts and use 
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these to assign employment security scores to each transition. Muffels and Luijkx (2008a,b) 
used this approach to assign scores to each transition. Eventually, instead of using this 
subjective approach one might also try to assign more objective scores based on research 
into the security each transition offers to people in the short-term and the long-term.   
We replicated the figures calculated by the EMCO-IG for this employment contract 
transition indicator for the years 2005-20063. The results are presented in Figure 4.1. The 
EMCO group proposes to combine lateral and upward mobility to view to what extent 
employment security is at least as good the next year compared to this year. The variation 
across countries is relatively small (the light blue bars) due to the large share of people 
staying employment secure rather than changing employment security in all countries. The 
downward mobility figures show larger variation with Poland having the largest downward 





A measure summarizing all the information contained in the mobility table might be to 
subtract downward mobility from the sum of lateral and upward mobility. This then 
measures the net employment security increase. The variation is then larger (dark blue bars) 
and the results look plausible rendering valuable information about the distribution of 
employment security transitions in Europe. Iceland, Luxembourg, France, Denmark and 
Austria show the highest levels of net employment security increases according to this 
indicator and Spain, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland the lowest.  
 
The ETS indicator for employment transition security 
In an earlier attempt to define an indicator for employment security Muffels and 
Luijkx, (2008a,b) used a similar approach but making only a distinction between upward and 
                                 
3
 The SILC data for Germany on employment status contained only four categories in 2006 instead of seven as 
in 2005 and for the other countries. For Denmark information is lacking on temporary contracts because of 































Figure 4.1: Employment contract transition security, EU26, 2005-
2006 (EMCO) 
 
Lat+Up Lat+Up-Down Down Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2005-2006 
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downward moves into employment security by considering lateral moves either as upwards 
(for people in employment) or as downwards moves (for people out of employment). The 
transition matrix is shown below. The measure has been called the dynamic employment 
security measure (ESD) but is named here the Employment Transition Security (ETS) 
indicator. 
The underlying idea is that staying in employment for another year reinforces people’s 
employment security whereas another year in inactivity, unemployment or even studies 
impairs the chances to move out of non-employment. That does not mean that the 
employment security by definition is always lower for non-employed people, especially not 
when they are engaged in education and training, but only that they are more likely to 
experience a reduced employment security due to being longer out of the labour market.  
Even for people in education, their situation might merely reflect their worse employment 
perspectives for which reason they are unable to re-enter employment and therefore 
prolong their stay in education. There is rather strong evidence in the labour market 
literature for supporting this assumption.  
 
Table 4.2.: Transition matrix ETS (Employment Transition Security)  




Rank ES 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 
Perm contract 1+ 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- 7- 
Self-Employment 8+ 9+ 10- 11- 12- 13- 14- 
Temp 15+ 16+ 17+ 18- 19- 20- 21- 
Unemployment 22+ 23+ 24+ 25- 26- 27- 28- 
Studies 29+ 30+ 31+ 32- 33- 34- 35- 
Early Retirement 36+ 37+ 38+ 39- 40- 41- 42- 
Inactivity 43+ 44+ 45+ 46- 47- 48- 49- 
Source: Derived from Muffels and Luijkx, (2008), own additions 
 
 
Furthermore, the ranking of the various contract statuses in terms of employment security 
within employment was based on the opinions of people of how secure the various statuses 
were. The ETS indicator allows examining to what extent employment security is improved 
or lowered yearly by calculating the difference between upward and downward mobility 
from Table 4.2. The indicator is considered a measure for employment transition security in 
society and is called the “Employment Transition Security” (ETS) indicator. One can use this 
measure to calculate it for people in employment and unemployment or inactivity separately 
or disaggregating it by gender and age class. The calculation of the ETS indicator on SILC 
resulted in the following picture for employment transition security by country. Though the 
variation across countries is larger the overall picture is not very different from the EMCO-IG 
transition indicator and shows that especially the Scandinavian countries Norway, Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark together with the UK perform well in employment transition security 
(ETS upward-downward transition security) whereas the Eastern and Baltic states show 







Ad 2. Transition by employment status and pay level  
The second EMCO-IG indicator deals with transitions by employment status and pay levels. 
The idea is to measure transitions between employment and non-employment statuses 
(studies, unemployment, inactivity) and within employment by pay level (movements up or 
down the pay ladder defined by deciles of  gross or net hourly wages). The indicator is seen 
as an output indicator for the success of life long learning policies. One may question the 
implicit assumption that it signals the effects of employability policies, since the indicator 
deals only indirectly with investments in employability or life long learning, because of which 
other factors than life long learning policies might impact on these transitions. Secondly, the 
existing evidence in the literature on the pay-off of training investments is not uncontested, 
not for its effect on future wages and not for its short-term effects on current wages.  Again, 
the ranks implicitly assigned by the EMCO-IG to the various status groups are presented in 
the second panel showing that a higher score of employability security is assigned to 
statuses of fulltime training and education (studies) than to statuses of unemployment or 
inactivity.  
Two issues arise: first, a movement from studies to studies is seen as a movement 
into more employability security (+). However, the longer stay in studies might not be an 
indicator for an increase in employability security but a decline since it might act as a second 
rank option for someone not being able to find the job he wants. Secondly, it is assumed 
that a higher position in the wage distribution by wage deciles is considered to reflect a 
higher attained level of employability security (+) though it is unclear whether the increase is 
due to training or life-long learning policies or just associated with changes in the socio-
economic context (e.g. labour market conditions) or in the changing composition of the 
participants (of training) and non-participants. However, the fractions of people moving 
after training into better (paid) jobs compared to people without training might give at least 
































Figure 4.2: Employment Transition Security (ETS) by country, EU26, 
2005-2006  
 
ETS:Up ETS:Up-Down ETS:Down 
Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2005-2006 
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Table 4.2: Transitions from year t to t+1 by employment status and pay level within 
employment 
  EMCO-IG Stud Oth. Ina  Une Empl-Dec1 ,,,,,,,, Empl-Dec10 
Rank ES  4 6 5 3 2 1 
Stud 1+ 2- 3- 4+ 5+ 6+ 
Oth. Ina 7+ 8= 9+ 10+ 11+ 12+ 
Une 13+ 14- 15= 16+ 17+ 18+ 
Empl-Dec1 19+  20-  21- 22=  23+  24+  
..... 25+ 26- 27- 28- 29= 30+ 
Empl-Dec10 31+ 32-  33- 34-  35-  36= 
Note: Stud=Studies i.e. (education, training), Une=Unemployment, , Oth. Ina=Other Inactivity (retirement, 
caring, inactive).  
Source: Derived from EMCO-IG (2009), own additions 
 
 
In the next graph we depict the outcomes of this employment-pay transition indicator. We 
also calculated the indicator for net annual wages and for the hourly gross wage for EU154 
but the results are largely similar. In addition we calculated the summary measure being the 
sum of lateral and upward mobility minus downward mobility. This summary measure is also 





                                 
4
 We calculated hourly gross and net wages using the information on last year’s usual number of working hours 
as reported at the last year’s interview. Since the wage information already refers to last year’s wages the 
calculation of hourly wages requires information for two years ago implying that we had information only for 






















Figure 4.3: Transitions by employment status and pay level 
Lat+Up Down Lat+Up-Down 
Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2005-2006 
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The results show that the classification of countries according to this employment status 
transition-pay indicator is rather different for a number of countries. Portugal, Greece and 
Cyprus show the highest level of transition-pay security (lat+up-down) and Latvia, Estonia 
and Spain the lowest.  
 
Working time mobility 
Another component of flexible contractual arrangements concerns working time mobility or 
the mobility between various flexitime arrangements. In the next table we depict the 
mobility between part-time and full-time jobs in 2005-2006. A move from a part-time job in 
2005 to a full-time job in 2006 is considered an upward move and a move from a fulltime to 
a part-time job a downward move. A part-time job is defined as a job with usual working 
hours of less than 35 hours a week. A further distinction can be made to include shorter (1-
16 hours) and longer hours part-time work (16-24 and 24-34 hours) but these are not shown 
here. The Netherlands exhibit the largest fraction of people moving from a part-time job into 






4.2.2. Flexible and Contractual Arrangements (FLCA): flexibility-mobility indicators 
 
The two EMCO-IG transition indicators aim at measuring employment and pay security 
transitions and though they deal with flexibility as well, they do not measure the different 
levels of flexibility or mobility in a country. We might therefore consider alternative mobility 
indicators trying to measure mobility per se. In earlier work (Muffels & Luijkx, 2008a,b; 
Chung, 2008, 2009) referred to in chapter 2 we applied indicators for occupational mobility 
indicating job mobility, contract mobility and income security transitions. We applied these 
indicators for flexibility using the information contained in the ECHP. We replicate these 
figures now using the SILC data.  
 
Job and contract mobility 
Instead of using figures on occupational mobility as an indicator for job mobility the SILC 







































































Figure 4.4: Upward and downward working time mobility 
(parttime to fulltime and vice versa) 
Upward (wtu) Downward (wtd) Upward+Downward (wtu+wtd) 
Source: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2006 
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the respondent changed job since last year or not. This information on job mobility is hence 
based on respondent’s self-reported or subjective assessment. The data provide no 
information about whether the change involves an employer’s change or not.5  This means 
that a distinction between internal (with the same employer) and external (job move to 
another employer) mobility appeared unfeasible. It also implied that no information is 
available on functional flexibility, the move to a higher or lower level job with the same  
employer. Would SILC provide information on occupation at two-digit level we could have 
derived a measure for occupational status and hence, for occupational mobility by 
comparing occupational status levels across two years. We would then had a measure for 
occupational status mobility though still being unable to make a distinction between internal 
and external mobility. A measure of occupational status mobility has been elaborated in 
earlier work (Muffels & Luijkx, 2008a,b). The job mobility indicator is calculated as the 
percentage of employed people aged 16-64 that changed job last year weighted (multiplied) 
with the shares of both contract statuses in employment (permanent or temporary contract) 
to arrive at a population wide estimate. Results are depicted in the next graph. The lowest 
job mobility rates are observed (see Figure 4.5.1) in Poland, Slovenia, Greece, Germany, 
Netherlands, France and Luxembourg and the highest in Hungary, Spain, Sweden and 
especially the UK. Spain has a remarkably high level of job mobility that is especially due to a 
high job-to-job mobility for workers in temporary contracts. The job mobility among workers 






Denmark has lower job mobility rates than we expected beforehand for Denmark is known 
for its lean employment protection though the picture is blurred due to lack of information 
on the mobility of workers on temporary contracts.  
The SILC data also provide information about the voluntary or involuntary nature of a 
job change. Below, we depict the information for permanent contracts. A job change is 
                                 
5
  For Norway the figures for 2005 and 2006 were implausibly high (55-66%) for which reason we for 
presentation purposes averaged the mobility figures for 2003 and 2004 for each respondent and uses these to 












Figure 4.5.1. Self-reported job change since last year (job 
mobility), by contractstatus and country, weighted with 
shares in employment, EU27, 2006 
Permanent job Temporary job Permanent + temporary job 
Source:  Eurostat, Silc, 2005-2006 
 
36 
involuntary if it is due to the end of a temporary contract (even though one knows in 
advance when the contract ends), sale of or business closure, redundancy, early retirement 
or dismissal. The other reasons are considered voluntary: seeking a better job, child care or 
care for dependent others, the need to move due to partner’s job and other reasons. We 
further assumed that if someone had a job change but didn’t give an answer to the question 
on the reason of change we assigned these people to the category other reasons and hence 
assumed the job change to be voluntary.  
Both, the voluntary and involuntary nature of job changes are important for mbility since the 
more flexible the labour market is the higher voluntary mobility tend to be especially in open 
ended contracts. A more flexible labour market is likely to have more involuntary mobility 
due to dismissal or redundancy but not because of business close downs or early retirement. 
For that reason we assume that voluntary mobility for open ended or permanent contracts is 
a better measure for flexibility than job mobility per se. In Figure 4.5 we present the results. 
The findings show that the voluntary mobility is much larger than involuntary job mobility. 
Lowest voluntary and involuntary quits have Poland, Slovenia, Germany, Portugal, 
Luxembourg and France. The UK show highest voluntary and involuntary quits reflecting the 






In the next step we used the panel information for 2005 and 2006 to calculate the contract 
mobility rate as the weighted mean of the annual transition rates (here from 2005 to 2006) 
between the three different contract statuses: a permanent job, a temporary job and self-
employment. We calculated the indicator by calculating mobility rates for people between 
16 and 65 years who changed contract status across two years (CM) weighted with the 
fraction of people in that particular contract status between 16 and 65 years old to arrive at 
a population wide measure for contract mobility6. 
 
                                 
6
 The figures for Denmark concern the mobility between permanent contracts and self-employment only and are 
















Figure 4.5.2: Voluntary, involuntary and total job mobility 
permanent contracts, EU26, SILC 2005-2006 
Voluntary job mobility  







Contract mobility rates are very low in the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Portugal and 
Iceland (though the figures for Denmark are biased: see note 7) but high in Hungary, Slovakia 
and Spain. High contract mobility shows the volatility of the various contract statuses in the 
labour market rather than signalling a flexible labour market. A segmented labour market 
shows more volatility because of a large segment of temporary jobs but due to the entry 
barriers to a permanent job also a low mobility into permanent jobs. The mobility rates from 
temporary jobs into permanent jobs are therefore important and show to what extent 
temporary jobs act as a “stepping stone” into permanent jobs or as a state in which people 
are entrapped without much chance to escape. Figure 4.6.2 shows the results. The 
unregulated labour markets of Ireland and the UK show the highest mobility rates into 
permanent jobs but remarkably also some Eastern and Baltic countries such as Hungary, 
Latvia and especially Estonia. Very low mobility rates are found in the Southern countries but 
also in the Netherlands and especially France. The figures for the mobility rates after two 


















































































Figure 4.6.1. Contractmobility all persons aged 
16-64 (CM), EU26, 2005-2006 
CM 













































































Figure 4.6.2: Mobility from temporary into permanent 
contract by country,  all persons aged 16-64, EU26, 2005-2006 
Contractmobility, unweighted (CMTP) 
Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2005-2006 
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A flexible labour market however is characterized by a combination of a high level of 
voluntary job mobility (for regular jobs), a high level of mobility from non-standard into 
standard permanent jobs (numerical flexibility) and a high level of upward wage or income 
mobility (wage flexibility).   
 
Income and wage mobility  
We therefore calculated measures for income and wage mobility (in particular concerning 
wage plus benefit income). Wage mobility is part of the flexicurity concept presented in 
Chapter 1 and an important indicator for the level of flexibility on the labour market.  
Income and wage mobility are important issues since they relate to the extent by which the 
institutions on the labour market and in the social security system render incentives to 
people to search and to move to a better job. It is also associated with one of the key issues 
in the flexicurity debate on transition security, the security attained when people either 
voluntarily or involuntarily change positions and because of that become more or less secure 
in terms of income.  
 
There is a vast literature on the subject of income mobility and income inequality to which 
we refer. The most famous measure of income mobility is the Shorrocks’ permanent income 
inequality and mobility measure. It is calculated as the weighted average of the inequality of 
permanent income, the income over a particular period  of time, and the annual levels of 
inequality weighted with the share of each year’s income in the total income earned in that 
period. The measure shows to what extent people might recover from income shocks 
happening to them over time either by finding a new job, remarriage or being lucky in the 
lottery. The impact of the design of policies for the capability of people to recover fully or 
partly and more or less quickly is an important topic for research though not one we want to 
capture here. Since SILC has information on 26 countries for two years only yet, we focus on 
elaborating output or outcome indicators on wage transitions as well as on changes in 
benefit incomes and between wage and benefit incomes to first indicate the performance of 
countries to allow people of different income levels to improve themselves in terms of 
income growth and secondly to provide further evidence on the transition security issue.  
 
One way of looking at mobility is to look at the yearly transitions in incomes or wages over 
time. One obvious way is to create equal income groups consisting of e.g. 10% of all income 
recipients ranging from low to high incomes (deciles). One can then look at the percentage 
of people changing one or more deciles. This is part of the approach of the EMCO-IG with 
respect to the second employment-status-pay indicator aimed at measuring changes in 
earnings prospects due to movements within employment. The average wage deciles 
transition rates can be used as a wage mobility indicator.  We can look into upward mobility 
(move up in decile number) and downward mobility (move down), the sum of which 
represents total wage mobility (WM). People can also remain in the same decile (stable). In 








The picture is largely similar to the picture for the EMCO-IG combined employment status-
pay indicator. Again, the Eastern and Baltic labour markers show largest wage mobility rates 
(WM) but also rather high downward rates (down) whereas the liberal UK labour market 
exhibits rather modest overall wage mobility but also low downward wage mobility rates. A 
disadvantage of decile changes instead of percentage changes is that people can change 
deciles or ranks due to compositional changes across two years without having changed 
much in their personal incomes. And even a small change might already cause a change in 
the person’s deciles ranking. 
 
 
4.2.3. Life long learning and active labour market policies (LLL/ALMP) 
 
One of the most important components of flexicurity policies concerns the investment in the 
education and training of workers raising their employability and safeguarding their 
transition security whenever there is need to make a transition into another job. One 
obvious indicator therefore concerns the participation in education, life-long learning and 
continuous vocational training programmes either offered within firms by employers or 
organized outside the firm by the labour market institutions. Other indicators deal with the 
duration, the costs, the age-specific participation rate, the kind of qualifications obtained or 
the type of training (firm specific or general) and the level of education offered. There are 
already many institutional indicators formulated using this type of information (cf. 
Mascherini, 2008). Here we are concerned with the definition of dynamic or transition 
indicators. An obvious indicator is the transition of trainees moving into a better paid job or 
into a permanent job after training. The larger the proportion of people moving into a better 
paid or permanent job after training the better the labour market seem to perform even 
though the causal relationship is far from clear. For working people we might look into the 
move to higher paid jobs but for non-working people the move to a temporary or permanent 
job seems more relevant. We believe that the larger the share of people moving after 
training into a temporary job and the lower the percentage of people moving into a 
permanent job the worse the labour market performs with a view to rewarding the 










































































































Figure 4.7: Wage mobility by wage income deciles, EU26, 2005-
2006 
UP Down WM Stable 







The mobility rates into permanent jobs after training are shown to be largest in Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and the UK and lowest in the Southern countries Italy, Spain, 
Greece and Portugal but also in Poland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany and France. The 
more regulated countries show the lowest mobility rates into permanent jobs. In Spain many 
people, probably most of them young, move into temporary jobs after training.     
 
Also for active labour market policies a number of static institutional indicators, such as the 
percentage of GDP spent to active and passive LMP arrangements and the number of people 
covered in particular LM programmes, are available and used in the EES context (Mascherini 
and Manca, 2009). Dynamic indicators tend to increasingly become available like the number 
of people re-entering  employment after some time in training or other employment 
reintegration programme (public employment services). Dynamic outcome indicators might 













































































Figure 4.8: Job mobility after training to permanent and 
temporary contracts, 2005-2006 
to perm (jmtrp) to temp (jmtrt) all (jmtr) 










IT LU SI FR BE PT AT GR HU CY SK IE PL CZ ES UK EE LT DK FI NO NL SE LV IS DE EU 
Country 
Figure 4.9.1: Re-entry into work and exit out of employment of 
people 16-65, by country, EU26, 2005-2006 
Re-entry into employment Exit outof employment 
Source: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2006 
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These exit and re-entry rates can be defined conditional on some elapsed time in or duration 
of previous (un)employment. Table 4.9.1 shows that re-entry is largest in Germany and the 
Nordic countries including Iceland. Exit is large in Hungary and Finland.  
Table 4.9.2 shows the re-entry rates into employment conditional on elapsed 
duration of unemployment in the last year. It is clear that for people staying unemployed the 
entire 12-months period, the re-entry chances are much lower than for people staying 
unemployed for less than one year.  Again the highest re-entry chances for the long-term 
unemployed being unemployed for at least one year are observed in Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries and the lowest remarkably in Finland, Ireland and the UK, and the 






4.2.4. Modern Social Security Systems (MSS) 
 
4.2.4.1. Transitions in wage and benefit incomes 
 
Institutional indicators developed in the EES framework jointly by the Commission and the 
OECD (see 'tax and benefit' project) in the domain of modern social security systems (MSS) 
deal with the spending and coverage of benefits, the financial incentives to take up work 
(unemployment and inactivity "traps"), the level and duration of benefits (replacement rates 
for short and long-term unemployment) and the availability of child care services, the latter 
indicating the work-life balance. In 2009 on the basis of this information a composite MSS 
institutional indicator has been defined by Governatori et al. (2009). Here we focus on 
defining dynamic outcome indicators. Modern social security schemes allow people to 
switch more easily between employment and benefit statuses and to render in-work income 
support to people while working (part-time). Our measure therefore views changes in 
income earned from wage or social security income across two years. It might be that people 
change from unemployment into employment because of which benefit income drops and 



































































Figure 4.9.2: Re-entry into employment of people 16-64 
after x months of unemployment in last year, EU24, 2005-
2006 
1-5months 6-11months 12months 
Source: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2006 
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family formation events (divorce, separation), social security or benefit related events but 
also a variety of other labour market related events (e.g. health shock, part-time work, 
short-time work). In the first figure we calculated the number of people experiencing a more 
than 10% upwards (up) or downward change in wage plus social security income 
(unemployment, disability, pensions, education benefits) across two years. People staying 





We show the upward (Up) and downward (Down) mobility rates and the net income 
improvement (NYI=Up+Lat-Down). Portugal, together with the Nordic countries, show the 
largest average net income improvement but with low upward and downward mobility 
rates. Remarkably, also Greece scored high whereas Spain, Austria and the UK show the 
lowest level of upward and highest level of downward income mobility.  
In the next graph the net income improvement indicator is disaggregated by men and 
women showing that in most countries men are better off but in some countries women 


































Figure 4.10.1: Upward and downward mobility (>10%) plus net 
income improvement (Lat+Up-Down) of people on wage 
and/or benefit income, 2005-2006 
Up >10% Up+Lat-Down Down 






Income mobility by social group: employed versus unemployed 
The income mobility measures are indicators for short-term wage and social security income 
mobility and stability. The indicators can of course be calculated for different social groups 
like low income people, people on benefits versus people on different levels of wages and 
before and after an event like divorce or poverty to see what happens with both income 
components. When more years become available one can calculate it for more years to get a 
measure for changes in permanent income. In Figure 4.10.3 we depict the downward and 
upward mobility rates (net annual wage + social security income more than 10% lower or 
higher the next year) by employment status (employed versus unemployed people). The 
figure shows huge differences between the chances for the unemployed and employed to 
move downwards and upwards on the income ladder. The opportunities for employed 
people to escape downward moves and to experience upward moves appear much higher in 













Figure 4.10.2: Net income improvement (NYI) at least 10%, 
wage plus benefit incomes, EU26, 2005-2006 
Male-NYI Female-NYI 












Figure 4.10.3. Upward and Downward Income Transitions (>10%) by 
employment status, EU26, 2005-2006 
Down Une Down Emp 
UP Une UP Emp 




The unemployed in Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Iceland and France have the lowest chance 
to move downwards and the unemployed in the Southern, Baltic and Eastern states the 
highest but also in the UK the unemployed have high chances to see their income fall with 
more than 10%. Upward mobility is remarkably not very high in Denmark neither for the 
unemployed nor the employed but even lower in the UK which is unexpected given the 
unregulated liberal labour market.  
 
4.2.4.2 Transition income security indicators 
 
The indicators explained before measure income transitions and as such indicate to what 
extent people remain income secure across two years. More specific measures on transition 
income security can be constructed by viewing particular risk groups such as the in-work 
poor or workers on low wages:  
1. In-work low-income transition security (moving out of poverty)  
2. In-work low-wage and income poverty transition insecurity and  
3. In-work low-wage transition security.  
Ad 1. The first one is already mentioned in Chapter 3 and elaborated in previous work 
(Muffels, 2008). It concerns the extent by which persons living in poor households are able 
to escape income poverty from year to year according to the 60% median equivalent 
household income threshold that is used by the European Commission (see chapter 3). We 
use this measure also to calculate it separately for working and non-working people. The 
indicator makes a distinction between those who enter poverty (downward mobility into 
poverty for the non-poor plus those who stay poor) and those who exit poverty (upward 
mobility out of poverty plus those who stay out of poverty). The YSI indicator is the 
difference between the upward and downward mobility rates weighted with the shares of 
the poor and the non-poor for each group of working and not-working people. Since income 
is asked only for the previous year we were able to calculate transition rates only for EU15 
on incomes for 2004 and 2005.  
Ad 2. The second indicator concerns the in-work low-wage and income poverty transition 
insecurity measure for low wage workers or workers below the OECD’s 67% of the average 
or median personal wage threshold who enter or escape income poverty. This threshold is 
used to calculate the number of workers in low wage jobs that either makes a downward 
transition in terms of income by entering income poverty or an upward transition by passing 
the income poverty threshold mentioned under 1.  
Ad 3. The third indicator also pertains to low wage but uses the same 67% threshold of the 
OECD to calculate the number of people that is able to either escape low wage (upward 
mobility), or to remain in low wage (lateral mobility) or to enter low wage (downward 
mobility) from one year into the next. In Figure 4.11.1 we show the YSI indicator for three 






The working poor are more likely to improve their net income security than the non-working 
poor in all countries but especially in Ireland, Belgium and Denmark. In Italy and Greece the 
working poor have the lowest chances to improve their net income security across these two 
years (2004-2005) though still more than 70% was able to improve their income security 
(stay or move out of poverty) in these two countries between 2004 and 2005. The YSI is 
calculated as the difference between gains and losses of income security.  
In Table 4.11.2 we compare the income security losses (staying poor or moving into 
poverty) for the working and non-working people by country. The same can be done for the 
gains (staying out of poverty or escaping poverty). Again Ireland, Belgium, Sweden and 
Denmark show the lowest income security losses for the workers and the Southern countries 















GR IT ES PT LU AT FR EE IS NO FI DK SE BE IE EU 
Figure 4.11.1: Net Income security improvement of all  
people 16-64 (ysi), the working  (ysiw) and non-working 
population(ysinw) by country, 2004-2006 
ysi ysiw ysinw 









IE BE SE DK FI NO IS EE FR AT LU PT ES IT GR EU 
Figure 4.11.2: Net Income security losses (staying poor + 
moving into poverty) by employment status , population 
16-65 years, by country, 2004-2005 
Non-working (ysinwd) Employed (ysiwd) 
Source: Eurostat, SILC 2005-2006 
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The second transition income security indicator concerns the proportion of people moving 
out of low wage and also moving out of poverty, and the proportion of people moving into 





Again Ireland shows the highest proportions of people escaping low wage and 
simultaneously escaping poverty but also shows the highest overall mobility (entry + exit) 
due to people entering low wage and poverty. Belgium and Denmark show rather low levels 
of people moving out of low wage and poverty.  The Southern countries exhibit low escape 
rates out of low wage and poverty but paralleled with low entry levels into low wage and 
poverty. The last low-wage transition security indicator shows the upward mobility rates out 
of low wage and the downward mobility rates into low wage. Slovakia has the highest inflow 
in low wage jobs and also high outflows whereas Latvia has the highest exits out of low wage 













BE DK IT GR FR SE LU ES FI AT NO EE PT IS IE EU 
Country 
Figure 4.11.3: Transitions out/in low-wage and out/in poverty, 
EU15, 2004-2005  
Out of low-wage + Out of poverty In low-wage + Into poverty Entry + Exit 






Most indicators point in the same direction with respect to the scores of countries on the 
various indicators dealing with transition employment security and transition income and 
low-wage security. In the final part we switch to the dynamic indicators on work-life balance 
security.   
 
4.2.4.3   Work-Life Balance security indicators 
 
In the first step we employed two rather straightforward static measures on work-life 
balance security. One measure deals with the labour market participation rates and the 
other with the share of part-time employment, both disaggregated by the life course stage 
people are in. Life course stage has been constructed using information on household type, 
number of dependent children between 0 and 24 years old and age of the head and the 
partner7. The evidence is depicted in Figure 4.12.1. Labour market participation appears 
highest among couples between 25 and 55 years of age and part-time employment among 
single mothers. This is not surprising but the differences across countries appear rather 
large. 
 
                                 
7
  Dependent children are children living in the household younger than 15 years or between 15 and 24 years 













Figure 4.11.4: Upward and downward mobility out and into 
low-wage, EU26, 2004-2005 
Into low-wage 
Out of low-wage 





We selected two life course stage categories, single mothers (SM) and mothers belonging to 
a couple with one or two children in the stage when they combine work and care most, that 
is between the age of 25 and 55 years (MC), to show the variation across countries. The 


















Figure 4.12.1 Labour market participation and part-time employment 
rates, persons 15-64, by life course stage,  
EU26, 2006  
LMP 
Part-time 












SI SK HU EE LV CZ LT FI PL CY SE PT IS DK GR ES NO IT LU BE AT FR UK IE DE NL EU 
Country 
Figure 4.13.1: Labour Market Participation and Part-Time 
Employment of Mothers 25-55 years in Couples with 1-2 children, in 
%, EU, 2006 
LMP 
Part-time 
Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2003-2006 
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The picture is very different for participation and part-time work with huge differences 
across the countries. Low proportions of mothers in couples participate in the Southern and 
some Eastern countries but also in Ireland whereas large fractions of coupled mothers are 
employed in the Nordic countries and in some Baltic and Eastern states. A high proportion of 
coupled mothers work part-time in France, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands on top of 






Single mothers work most in Norway, Iceland, Austria and Germany and in the Baltic states 
Estonia and Latvia but least in Southern and some Eastern countries. Low proportions of 
single mothers work part-time in the Eastern former socialist countries of the EU but high 
proportions are found in Belgium, Austria, Germany, France, Ireland, the UK and on top the 
Netherlands. The picture is very much similar for single mothers compared to mothers in 
couples. The differences across countries are huge. In the Netherlands less than 30% of 
single mothers between 25 and 55 years work but most of them (90%) work part-time, 
whereas in Latvia 50% of these women work but only 10% in part-time jobs.   
  
Exit and re-entry mobility by life-course stage 
These indicators on the work-life balance are static and don’t take cohort changes into 
account though they reflect women’s participation behaviour in different life course stages. 
Another way of looking into the work-life balance is to examine to what extent mothers in 
different life course stages changes their participation across time and withdraw from the 
labour market (exit) or re-enter into employment. These dynamic indicators are presented in 
the next two graphs where we look into the proportions of coupled and single mothers 
between 25 and 55 years who exit and re-entry across two years. 
 
Again the picture is very different between the two life course stages and across countries. 
The Nordic countries show low levels of exit among coupled mothers. Rather high levels of 
exit mobility of single mothers are observed in the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland, Iceland, 










SI SK EE CZ LV HU LT PL DK CY IS BE AT FI GR SE NO PT ES IT LU DE FR IE UK NL EU 
Country 
Figure 4.13.2: Labour Market Participation and Part-Time 
Employment of Single Mothers 25-55 years, in %,  EU, 2006 
LMP 
Part-time 
Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2003-2006 
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Luxemburg and Iceland and relatively high in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and in 







Work-life balance transition security 
In addition, SILC is used to define a measure for work-life balance transition security. It 
departs from a transition matrix of working time and work-care combinations between t-1 
and t. The matrix is then used to examine to what extent people move from one work-care 
combination into another the next year and whether that improves their opportunities to 




































































Fig. 4.14.1: Exit mobility by life course stage, single parent and 
couple 25-55 with children 
Couple 25-55 with children (lmrecplch) 
Singleparent (lmresp) 






































































Fig. 4.14.2: Re-entry mobility by life course stage, single parent 
and couple 25-55 with children 
Couple 25-55 with children (lmrecplch) 
Singleparent (lmresp) 




To be able to calculate WLB transition security, information is needed about the number of 
working hours and preferably also about the number of caring hours people spent each 
week. Whether the actual work-care combination in terms of working and caring hours 
improves people’s work-life balance depends on how the combination meets people’s 
personal preferences for working time and leisure. We don’t think like in Hakim’s preference 
formation theory (2001) that preferences are set at the beginning of the career and fixed for 
the rest of their working lives, but we do think that a flexible supply of various work-care 
combinations might better fulfil the preferences of women and might better fit to their 
work-life balance needs. This however requires information on the extent by which men and 
women are able to meet their working time preferences on the labour market with a view to 
combining work and care.  
SILC contains information on hours of work for the head, the partner and all other household 
members but no information on time spent to caring nor on how many hours they prefer to 
work. Information on caring time and working time preferences is however available in some 
other surveys like some national panel studies such as the German SOEP. Information on 
time spent to caring is also available in time use surveys. Though the SILC data contain little 
time use information we were able to calculate a simple WLB transition security measure 
indicating the number of people improving or impairing their employment security (in terms 
of working hours) moving from one work-care combination into another.  
The measure is based on the number of hours worked by the partner in a partnered 
household and the presence of dependent children between 0 and 24 years needing care 
according to the Eurostat definition used in SILC. The starting point is the following transition 
matrix   (Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Transitions in work-care combinations defined by the partner’s number of hours 




























Value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No Work, no Care 1= 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 6+ 7+ 8+ 
Care only 9- 10= 11+ 12+ 13+ 14+ 15+ 16+ 
PT Work, no Care  17- 18- 19= 20+ 21+ 22+ 23+ 24+ 
Work only (FT) 25- 26- 27- 28= 29+ 30+ 31+ 32+ 
SPT Work + Care  33- 34- 35- 36- 37= 38+ 39+ 40+ 
PT Work + Care  41- 42- 43- 44- 45- 46= 47+ 48+ 
LPT Work + Care  49- 50- 51- 52- 53- 54- 55= 56+ 
FT Work + Care  57- 58- 59- 60- 61- 62- 63- 64= 
Note: Work-Care Combinations:  SPT=Short part time work 0-15 hours a week; PT=Part-Time 
work 16-24 hours; LPT=Long part-time work 25-35 hours, FT=Full-time work >35 hours  




People are classified into eight categories of which four categories represent different work-
care combinations and four represent situations in which people either do not work nor 
care, work only or care only.  The four work-care combinations are distinguished according 
to the number of hours the partners in the household work. They can work short part-time, 
part-time, long part-time or full-time. The more they work the less time there is available for 
caring. Since no information is available on the hours spent to caring it is assumed that the 
remainder of hours after subtracting working hours, and fixed numbers of hours for eating, 
shopping, personal care and relaxing, is available and needed for care due to the presence of 
one or more dependent children below 25 years of age. 
We assume that movements along the diagonal represent lateral movements in terms of 
employment security causing no change in WLB transition security. People might still change 
their combination of working hours and caring hours from year to year but within the limits 
defined by the various categories of part-time and full-time work. These lateral movements 
are indicated by the equal (=) sign. Movements from the four not-combining work and care 
categories to the four work-care combination categories are seen as an upward move in 
terms of WLB transition security and  indicated by the plus (+) sign. Movements within the 
various combination categories are seen as an upward move (indicated by a + sign) if care is 
combined with more working hours and as a downward move (indicated by the – sign) when 
care is combined with less working hours. Eventually, for those not combining moving from 
‘care only’ to ‘work only’ is seen as an upward move and from ‘work only’ to ‘care only’ as a 
downward move in terms of transition security.  We first calculate the proportions of people 
belonging to the eight categories of WLB combination security for 2006.   
 
 
Table 4.4: Proportions of (employed) people 15-65 years living in partnered households, 
belonging to various work-care combinations, EU26, 2006 








Partner no work, no care  19.85 9.7 
Partner FT work, no care  18.89 11.29 
Partner only care, no work  7.41 9.98 
Partner PT work, no care  14.89 20.38 
Partner  short PT work plus care  3.53 4.66 
Partner  PT work plus care  6.02 7.76 
Partner  Long PT work plus care  6.07 7.8 
Partner FT work plus care  23.33 28.43 
Total 100 100 
Source: Eurostat, SILC 2003-2006 
 
 
Almost 40% of all partnered households seem to combine work and care but almost 50% of 
the employed households (household with the head or any other household member 
employed). The partners combining full-time work with caring duties are the largest group, 
consisting of almost 25% of all households and 30% of households with an employed person.  
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In Figure 4.14.1 the proportions of people combining work and care by country are shown in 
which a further distinction is made between combining part-time work and care and full-
time work and care. WLB security is defined as the share of people either combining part-
time work and care or full-time work and care. The Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, 
Iceland, Sweden, Denmark) show the highest fractions of people combining work and care 
though most of these women work full-time and not part-time. A similar pattern of many 
women combining full-time work and care and few women combining part-time work and 
care is observed in the Baltic and Eastern countries, such as in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
and in Slovenia and Slovakia. The Southern countries (Spain, Italy, Greece) show the lowest 
fractions of people combining work and care. Part-time work and care combinations are very 






From the transition matrix in Table 4.4., we calculated the transition rates for moving 
between the eight work-care combinations we defined before. We calculated the upward, 
downward and lateral transition probabilities for moving between the various work-care 
combinations. In 3 out of 4 partnered households the level of transition security remained 
the same across the years 2005 and 2006 especially in Portugal, the Czech Republic and Italy. 
One in four partnered households changed transition security, equally split between upward 
movements, 13%, and downward movements, 13%. Sweden has the highest upward 
movement and Estonia the largest downward movement in these two years (25%). Also 
Denmark showed a large downward movement and also has one of the lowest net 
improvements in transition security (lateral plus upward minus downward movement). But 
also Estonia and Germany share low rates of net improvements in transition security. The 
differences across countries appear smaller than the differences in work-care combinations 
we observed earlier.  It seems that in all countries there is a tendency to combine work and 
































Figure 4.14.1: Work-Care Combinations of people between 15 and 65 
years and WLB security, in %, by country, EU26, 2006 
WLB security in %  PT Work-Care FT Work-Care 
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women combine full-time work and care and in others, part-time work combined with care 
is more prevalent. Whether the various combinations improve the work-life balance 
depends on partner’s preferences for combining work and care. These preferences though 
are dependent on the existing social norms as well as on the structure and level of 







4.3. Methodology of presenting evidence on flexicurity policies  
 
In chapter 3 we already reported on the Netherlands to show how the radar charts approach 
might be a good way to present multidimensional information on the relative performance 
of countries on the various components of flexicurity and work-life balance policies. The 
evidence on the indicators might be supplemented with the information on the efforts and 
challenges of the national actors and how they cope with these with more or less success.  
 
Visualisation of outcomes  
There are several ways to present the outcome information on indicators after normalisation 
or standardisation, for example, using ordinary tables, using two-dimensional or three 
dimensional plots, using radar charts (see the EMCO report 2008) or more refined methods 
like the DEA (development analysis) method. The latter though is basically a method for 
constructing composite indicators and will therefore not be discussed in detail. Two-
dimensional plots allow to plot two indicators, three-dimensional plots three indicators, but 
the radar charts three or more indicators (in two-dimensional space) which is useful given 
the various main areas of policies. Tables provide information on one single dimension but 
for the entire EU. The big advantage of radar charts is that they can depict more than three 
dimensions in two-dimensional space. We might even use them for depicting changes in 
























Figure 4.15: Work-Life Balance Transition Security by country, EU26, 
2005-2006 
lat+up lat+up-down down 
Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2005-2006 
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increases although we might in that case think of using composite indicators to overcome 
the complexity of visualisation of single indicators. Radar charts can of course be used for 
depicting the results on static as well as dynamic indicators and even on changes in 
indicators over time though with more than two years the evidence becomes hard to grasp 
(see the EMCO graphs in chapter 3). The charts can be constructed for comparisons of 
countries but also for comparisons between different social groups. The method provides 
therefore a strong tool for monitoring purposes. One clear disadvantage from an analytical 
point of view is that they represent the bivariate relationship between the indicator of 
concern and country whereas from an analytical point of view the researcher might be 
interested in the multivariate relationships as well though the outcomes of those analyses 
(parameter estimates) can be presented in these radar charts as well. The EMCO studies 
already showed how the radar charts can be used to show the information on transition 
indicators. When the number of indicators increases, the radar charts are not very 
appropriate anymore to render a clear comparative picture and there is need to reduce the 
information either by using composite indicators which are then mapped out in radar charts 
or by limiting the number of indicators by focusing on a few main indicators only. It depends 
for which purposes the charts are used. For analytical purposes composite indicators are 
sometimes more appropriate since they render one figure for each country instead of a 
multitude as dashboards of single indicators do. For policy purposes there is need for 
indicators with a clear substance and message for which single indicators seem better 







Flexicurity as a ‘Policy Strategy’: A Framework for monitoring 







5.1. Monitoring the progress of flexicurity policies 
 
The framework to be developed in this chapter aims at contributing to the broader effort 
undertaken by the European Commission (EU) in monitoring (the progress and 
implementation of) flexicurity (FLC) and work life balance (WLB) policies in the Member 
States (MS). The approach we take is twofold and sets out to develop two checklist 
methodologies that can be used by the EC. 
 
A. The first checklist methodology focuses on assessing the policy efforts put in by 
Member States in achieving the flexicurity oriented goals formulated in the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Lisbon Agenda.8 This is done by 
checking whether these policy efforts are  
i. aligned with the EU policy guidelines (EES and Lisbon Agenda)  
ii. internally consistent 
iii. operationalised with clear and quantified goals that can be monitored. 
B. The second checklist methodology takes the common principles and components 
of flexicurity as a starting point and introduces dynamic indicators that may serve 
to measure the progress MS make along these principles and components. 
Dynamic indicators pertain to changes in institutions (such as changes in EPL or 
replacement rates) as explained in chapter 3 and to transition or duration 
outcomes as theoretically worked out in Table 2.1 and operationalised in chapter 
4. The development of a set of dynamic transition flexicurity indicators has been 
the main emphasis of this study. 
 
5.2 The ESC model for monitoring MS policies 
 
Using the ESC model, articulated in the previous sections, we can arrive at a framework to 
monitor flexicurity policies. The monitoring framework is presented in Figure 5.1. Both, at 
the EU and Member State level policies can be analysed using the Efforts-States-Challenges 
                                 
8
 This report refers to the current Lisbon Agenda, but the methodology presented can be easily adapted to the 
newly emerging EU 2020 Agenda, 
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approach. However, policies at the EU level as implemented in the European Employment 
Strategy (EES) are not under scrutiny here. Rather, in the EES, Guidelines are put forward 
which are expected to translate into efforts at the MS level (solid arrow), or into challenges 
at the MS level (dashed arrow) 
In particular, in the monitoring framework, member states’ policies will be checked along 
the following three dimensions (two of which are shown in Figure 1 above). 
I. Alignment of MS policies with the EES Guidelines 
II. Internal consistency and coherence in MS policies by using an analytical framework  
(Efforts-States-Challenges model) for analysing the MS policy strategy 
III. Operationalisations of policy goals with the use of clear quantitative (EMCO or other) 
targets and indicators. 
 
In its simplest form Member States’ policies can score ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on all three dimensions. 
This means that a national policy that is perfectly aligned with the EES Guidelines, shows a 
sufficient degree of internal consistency and has the relevant quantifiable goals in place 
score ‘Yes’ three times. In practice we will see more gradual qualifications and in what 








Firstly, we distinguish the dimension of alignment of national policy with the flexicurity 
oriented Guidelines from the EES. From the description of the national policy framework one 
should easily be able to derive whether the proposed policy measures are indeed responding 



















Figure 5.1: Monitoring framework 
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which Guidelines are over, underrepresented, or even not reflected in the Member States’ 
policies. 
Some Guidelines are associated with specific targets that were mentioned explicitly 
in the Lisbon Strategy, e.g. the participation rate goal of 70% for males and 60% for females 
in 2010. Alignment with these specific targets is easily checked by looking at the current 
state of affairs with the relevant indicator and the formulated efforts to reach the Lisbon 
Strategy target. If the national policy does not mention the target, there is no alignment at 
all. When the national policy does mention the target and the current state of affairs, but 
does not formulate efforts to reach the target, there is partial alignment. 
  Guidelines can be characterized either as directed to Efforts, States or Challenges for 
the entire EU. This means that both, the EES and the national policy plans can be analysed 
using the Efforts-States-Challenges approach. However, as we already noted the EES as such 
is not part of the research and the EES in its practical operation and consequences for MS 
policies is particularly featured by the setting of concrete specific targets, rather than by the 
States or Effects which are of more relevance to the MS’s.  
The alignment of MS policies should be investigated using the vertical columns 
representing Efforts, States and Challenges on the EES Guidelines and MS national policy 
level respectively. Alignment of Efforts, States and Challenges does not mean that they have 
to be the same across the EU27. Different pathways to flexicurity exist – and are 
acknowledged by the EC - and different Challenges lead to different Efforts and hence, 
pathways. For example, due to the financial crisis that has hit the MS in different ways, MS 
are in different States despite similar Efforts and as a result the Challenges and pathways will 
possibly also differ (or continue to differ further). In other words, we expect to find groups of 
countries where one or another aspect of flexicurity is emphasized while other aspects are 
not regarded. Member states can be categorised depending on these pathways, also using 
the ESC methodology. Also, when aligning the MS policies with the EES Guidelines and the 
Lisbon Strategy targets, it is important that the States & Effects are more or less aligned. A 
gap in Efforts between the national policies and the Guidelines does not necessarily 
represent a big problem, since countries have their own beliefs about the best route to 
follow, and their own path-dependent roots and strategies in pursuing their own policies. 
This is reflected in the open method of coordination (OMC). However, it should be clear that 
each MS is gearing its efforts towards a certain State, where guidance is offered by the 
concrete EES target settings, leading to at least some degree of ‘performance convergence’ 
in Europe. Hence, the commonly agreed targets set at the EU level in the OMC process 
permit the MS to analyse their own performance with due consideration of regional 
differences within their own country e.g. by allowing different targets for different regions 
dependent on differences in the Challenges and States & Effects at the regional level.  
  
Dimension II 
On the second dimension, the ESC approach is used to check the internal consistency of the 
proposed MS policies. First of all, the proposed policy measures are mapped on to the three 
ESC-dimensions of Efforts, States and Challenges. The main consistency check is done by 
assessing whether the identified Efforts, States and Challenges are consistent with each 
other and to what extent the resulting Challenges lead to new policy proposals or Efforts. 
Furthermore the relation of the proposed policy measures (new Efforts) to the States 
and Challenges distinguished along the elements of the flexicurity matrix (internal-external 
and numerical-functional flexibility on the one hand and income, job, employment, wage 
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and combination security on the other) can be assessed. Are all elements of the flexicurity 
matrix consistently covered in the identified Efforts, States and Challenges? For this purpose, 
we elaborated an extended and dynamic input-output model, disentangling efforts, states 
and challenges over time (see Fig.  5.2). 
 
In this extended dynamic framework the EES Guidelines and concrete target settings feed 
into the process as Challenges, together with external economic shocks (such as the credit 
crunch) and the MS evaluation of their own Efforts and States in the previous round. All of 
these combined accounts result in socio-economic Challenges that need to be tackled with 
policy responses (New efforts) resulting in a ‘New state of flexicurity’. The new state (B) is 






In our monitoring framework we are checking whether the policy Challenges follow logically 
from the States and Effects of Flexicurity (A) and whether the New efforts are explicitly 
linked to the identified Challenges. Furthermore we can check the internal consistency of 
policy proposals and see to what extent they follow the flexicurity matrix and the ‘common 
principles’ of flexicurity (see Appendix A). The consistency check though with regard to the 
common principles is part of our second checklist methodology B. Under A it is just checked 
whether all elements of the flexicurity matrix are covered or not. This means, among other 
things that measures with regards to the various forms of flexibility are accompanied with 
measures dealing with the various forms of security in national policy plans.  
 
However, an important proviso to this approach is warranted. Even, when raising relatively 
simple questions (e.g. “Are policy measures creating an imbalance between flexibility and 
security?”) it does not suffice to just count the scores on flexibility and security measures 
and see if the resulting numbers are in balance. Rather it, ultimately, involves due to heir 
interrelationship, checking all the consequences for all relevant forms of flexibility and 
security (e.g. as encompassed in the flexicurity matrix) and subsequently weigh these 
consequences against each other. This would typically ask for in-depth evaluation research 
which goes beyond the scope of a simple ‘checklist’ methodology, and which easily appears 
unfeasible and impractical. But for analytical purposes this concern must be taken into mind. 
























External economic shocks 
Figure 5.2: Dynamic ESC model for checking internal consistency 
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very helpful. Furthermore, for countries that have shifted employment policy responsibilities 
to lower levels of government, it would be natural when MS’s view these regional policy 
plans with the same monitoring framework though with different target settings. This holds 
in particular for large countries (e.g. Spain) with large regional differences in labour market 
conditions and outcomes, but also for countries with different policies for different regions, 
such as Belgium.  
 
Dimension III 
In a third step it is investigated whether specific policy goals are formulated or not, whether 
they are quantified or not and which indicators are used for quantifying the policy goals and 
effects. In particular, reference must be made to the concrete targets set in the EES 
framework as a starting point for analysing one’s own MS performance. In addition to these 
targets, policy plans should provide the indicators used to show the MS ‘State of Flexicurity’ 
as well as providing clear indications of the policy efforts made with which effects. One can 
understand how some policy efforts cannot be easily quantified, especially those which deal 
with legal changes which effects are sometimes hard to measure. However, MS should make 
an effort in providing necessary information concerning the Efforts, States and Effects of 
their flexicurity policies. Furthermore we can assess whether use is made of proper 
indicators by the MS, and whether they align with the indicators agreed on at the EU level. 
Scoring or checking policy plans on these three dimensions will give considerable 
insight into the overall quality of policy plans operationalised by alignment, internal 
consistency, completeness and the meeting of quantified goals in the EES framework.  With 
respect to the writing up of National Reform Plans by the MS it could help to harmonise the 
reporting format across Member States and to improve the monitoring capabilities of the 
Commission and to make them more efficient. Given the nature of national policies in 
general (viz. not directly related to EU directives or guidelines) it would be troublesome to 
extend this harmonisation of writing up policy plans beyond the NRP or EES framework. In 
what follows, we illustrate this approach by scoring and checking a fictitious National Reform 
Plan on the three dimensions for the period 2008-2010.  
 
 
5.2.1 Illustration of the monitoring of MS policies: the EES as a starting point  
 
To illustrate the monitoring framework described above, we will now use the format of a 
fictitious National Reform Plan to illustrate how the monitoring based on the flexicurity and 
other employment Guidelines in the EES can be achieved. The starting point is again 
constituted by the three dimensions: 
 
I:   Alignment of NRP with EES Guidelines 
II:   Internal consistency and coverage of elements from the flexicurity matrix 
III:  Quantified goals and coverage of indicators 
Ad I. Alignment of the NRP with the EES Guidelines 
The guidelines offer the possibility to check whether the policy plans make explicit reference 




Table 5.1: Alignment of the NRP with the European Employment Strategy Guidelines9 
 
Macroeconomic Guidelines Explicitly 
mentioned in 
the NRP 
(1) To secure economic stability.  
(2) To safeguard economic and fiscal sustainability.  
(3) To promote a growth- and employment-orientated and efficient allocation 
of resources. 
 
(4) To secure economic stability for sustainable growth.  
(5) To ensure that wage developments contribute to macroeconomic stability 
and growth. 
 
(6) To contribute to a dynamic and well-functioning EMU.  
Microeconomic Guidelines  
(7) To increase and improve investment in R & D, in particular by private 
business. 
 
(8) To facilitate all forms of innovation.  
(9) To facilitate the spread and effective use of ICT and build a fully inclusive 
information society. 
 
(10) To strengthen the competitive advantages of its industrial base.  
(11) To encourage the sustainable use of resources and strengthen the 
synergies between 
 
environmental protection and growth.  
(12) To extend and deepen the internal market.  
(13) To ensure open and competitive markets inside and outside Europe and to 
reap the benefits of globalisation. 
 
(14) To create a more competitive business environment and encourage 
private initiative 
 
through better regulation.  




(16) To expand, improve and link up European infrastructure and complete 
priority cross-border projects. 
 
                                 
9




Table 5.1 (continued)  
Employment Guidelines Explicitly 
mentioned in the 
NRP 
The following (EU) targets and benchmarks have been agreed in the 
context of the European Employment Strategy: 
 that every unemployed person is offered a job, apprenticeship, 
additional training or other employability measure; in the case of 
young persons who have left school within no more than 4 months 
by 2010 and in the case of adults within no more than 12 months; 
 that 25 % of long-term unemployment should participate by 2010 
in an active measure in the form of training, retraining, work 
practice, or other employability measure, with the aim of achieving 
the average of the three most advanced Member States; 
 that jobseekers throughout the EU are able to consult all job 
vacancies advertised through Member States' employment 
services; 
 an increase by five years, at EU level, of the effective average exit 














(17) Implement employment policies aiming at achieving full employment, 
improving quality and productivity at work, and strengthening social and 
territorial cohesion. 
 
 Policies should contribute to achieving an average employment 
rate for the European Union (EU) of  
o 70 % overall in 2010, of at least  
o 60 % for women in 2010 and of  
o 50 % for older workers (55 to 64) by 2010, and to reduce 
unemployment and inactivity.  









based on national 




In addressing these objectives (above), action should concentrate on the 
following priorities: 
 attract and retain more people in employment (1), increase labour 
supply (2) and modernise social protection systems (3) 
 improve adaptability of workers (1)  and enterprises (2), 
 increase investment in human capital through better education (1) 









Table 5.1 (continued) 
Employment Guidelines Explicitly 
mentioned in the 
NRP 
(18) Promote a life-cycle approach to work.  
 a renewed endeavour to build employment pathways for young 
people (1)  and reduce youth unemployment (2), as called for in 
the European Youth Pact, 
 resolute action to increase female participation (1) and reduce 
gender gaps in employment (2), unemployment (3) and pay (4), 
 better reconciliation of work and private life(1) and the provision 
of accessible and affordable childcare facilities (2) and care for 
other dependants (3), 
 support for active ageing, including appropriate working conditions 
(1), improved (occupational) health status (2) and adequate 
incentives to work (3) and discouragement of early retirement (4),  
 modern social protection systems, including pensions and 
healthcare (1), ensuring their social adequacy (2), financial 
sustainability (3) and responsiveness to changing needs (4), so as 
to support participation and better retention in employment and 















(19) Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness, and 
make work pay for job-seekers, including disadvantaged people, and the 
inactive. 
 
 active and preventive labour market measures including early 
identification of needs, job search assistance, guidance and 
training as part of personalised action plans (1), provision of 
necessary social services to support the inclusion of those furthest 
away from the labour market (2) and contribute to the eradication 
of poverty (3), 
 continual review of the incentives and disincentives resulting from 
the tax and benefit systems, including the management and 
conditionality of benefits (1) and a significant reduction of high 
marginal effective tax rates (2), notably for those with low 
incomes, whilst ensuring adequate levels of social protection (3), 
 development of new sources of jobs in services for individuals and 












(20) Improve matching of labour market needs.  
 the modernisation and strengthening of labour market institutions, 
notably employment services, also with a view to ensuring greater 
transparency of employment and training opportunities at national 
and European level, 
 removing obstacles to mobility for workers across Europe within 
the framework of the Treaties,  
 better anticipation of skill needs, labour market shortages and 
bottlenecks, 













Employment Guidelines Explicitly 
mentioned in the 
NRP 
(21) Promote flexibility combined with employment security and reduce 
labour market segmentation, having due regard to the role of the social 
partners. 
 
 the adaptation of employment legislation, reviewing where 
necessary the different contractual and working time 
arrangements, 
 addressing the issue of undeclared work, 
 better anticipation and positive management of change, including 
economic restructuring, notably changes linked to trade opening, 
so as to minimise their social costs and facilitate adaptation, 
 the promotion and dissemination of innovative and adaptable 
forms of work organisation, with a view to improving quality and 
productivity at work, including health and safety, 
 support for transitions in occupational status, including training, 











(22) Ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wage-
setting mechanisms. 
 
 encouraging social partners within their own areas of responsibility 
to set the right framework for wage bargaining in order to reflect 
productivity and labour market challenges at all relevant levels and 
to avoid gender pay gaps, 
 reviewing the impact on employment of non-wage labour costs 
and where appropriate adjust their structure and level, especially 






(23) Expand and improve investment in human capital.  
 inclusive education and training policies and action to facilitate 
significantly access to initial, vocational, secondary and higher 
education, including apprenticeships and entrepreneurship 
training, 
 significantly reducing the number of early school leavers, 
 efficient lifelong learning strategies open to all in schools, 
businesses, public authorities and households according to 
European agreements, including appropriate incentives and cost-
sharing mechanisms, with a view to enhancing participation in 
continuous and workplace training throughout the life-cycle, 








Table 5.1 (continued) 
Employment Guidelines Explicitly 
mentioned in the 
NRP 
(24) Adapt education and training systems in response to new competence 
requirements. 
 
 raising and ensuring the attractiveness, openness and quality 
standards of education and training (1), broadening the supply of 
education and training opportunities (2) and ensuring flexible 
learning pathways and enlarging possibilities for mobility for 
students and trainees (3), 
 easing and diversifying access for all to education and training and 
to knowledge by means of working time organisation, family 
support services, vocational guidance and, if appropriate, new 
forms of cost sharing, 
 responding to new occupational needs, key competences and 
future skill requirements by improving the definition and 
transparency of qualifications (1), their effective recognition and 












In table 5.1 above, the alignment of a fictitious NRP to the Guidelines is examined by 
checking the implicit mentioning of the Guidelines themselves and, for the Employment 
Guidelines, also the priorities and other issues mentioned under the heading of these 
Guidelines in the European Council document 10614/2/08 REV 2. When issues are not 
explicitly mentioned under the Guideline, this does not necessarily mean that the 
government does not engage in these activities concerning these issues. Sometimes these 
issues are mentioned under other Guidelines. Furthermore, the mentioning of a policy goal 
or action in the NRP does not necessarily always result in real actions. 
 
With these caveats taken in mind, we can formulate some issues which need to be part of 
the assessment: 
 The reporting by the member states allows filling in table 5.1. that shows to what 
extent national policies are more or less fully aligned with the EES in the sense that 
the MS fully or only partially reports explicitly on priorities and other issues 
mentioned under the Employment Guidelines (17-24) 
 Particularly important is the alignment with the generic EU targets and benchmarks 
specified in the European Council document. Are these mentioned and clearly 
reported on the MS achievement?  
 Another focus is on how well the policy plans and reporting efforts explicitly refer to 
the various issues covered such as the work-life balance issue (Guideline 18) as one 
of the various important topics being part of the EES.  
 The assessment which issues are clearly reported and which not, indicates the main 
focus of the national policy and show where possibly effort gaps exist leading to the 





Ad II. Internal consistency of the reform plan 
One element of the assessment is to check the internal consistency of the reform plan. It 
first needs however an assessment whether policies are already up to date with the EES 
Guidelines meaning that there is no need to formulate new efforts and challenges. The 
check also concerns the question whether the policy plans mentioned in the NRP follow 
logically from the presented ‘state of affairs’ (states and effects). 
 
Efforts 
These are the policy endeavours in the past and the current existing measures and 
institutions. One can assess whether these are described in more or less detail in the NRP, 
basically only when they are deemed unsatisfactory and when there is need to be changed 
following the recommendations of the Commission in an earlier round. 
 
States and effects 
The reform plans will more or less extensively report on the states of affairs and the effects 
of previous efforts raising new challenges to policies. The assessment might examine on 
which issues policies are focused: on macro-economic policy, such as on the EMU balance 
and public debt, on micro-economic policy, e.g. on the competitiveness and innovation 
efforts, or on infrastructure and environmental issues. It shows the government’s priorities 
and provides information on whether other policy areas might lack behind.  
 
Challenges 
In our framework, Challenges are primarily a confrontation of the EES/LS Guidelines, the 
consequences of external economic shocks and the ‘States and effects (A)’ of policies. New 
efforts should follow logically from the challenges identified. The assessment concerns the 
question as to which challenges are formulated by the member states and which not? 
Another question is which challenges follow the recommendations of the Commission and 
which are initiated by the member states themselves.  
 
New efforts 
The assessment need to examine very specifically which new efforts are undertaken and to 
what extent in terms of coverage of people and expenditures spent, but also with a view to 
the expected and achieved outcomes. Again, information on target setting and 
achievements in that respect are very important. 
 
Consistency 
The consistency check also requires that sufficient information is provided on which efforts 
and how much money is spent and how successful these efforts were. As mentioned before, 
checking the internal consistency of an NRP on the basis of the flexicurity matrix and the 
‘common principles’ (see 5.3) is particularly time consuming, since it would involve the ex 
ante evaluation of all flexibility and security measures contained in the reform plans, and 
how they jointly contribute to improving the flexibility-security nexus. The checking of the 
efforts on the ‘four policy components’ of flexicurity is however relatively straightforward, 
but has already been performed in the first step (alignment with the EES) because the EES 




Ad III.  Monitoring using (predefined) MS indicators for MS achievements 
The assessment of the way of monitoring of the MS achievements by the member states 
themselves need a recording of the entire list of measures (‘new efforts’) proposed in the 
national reform plans.  These measures need to be characterized as ‘inputs’ or changes in 
the ‘process’ that should eventually lead to ‘outputs’ or ‘impacts’.  
Flexicurity guideline 21 requires to pay attention to the role of the social partners as 
an important ‘process’ variable. Furthermore the assessment need to investigate whether 
the NRP explicitly mentions a monitoring system for evaluating whether the aspired outputs 
and impacts are attained or not and to what extent. Also the reasons mentioned for failure 
or success and the tools used to evaluate provides valuable information on the self-
assessment of the efficacy of past and current efforts. Another aspect of the assessment of 
the NRP’s is to investigate whether the achievements are reported consistently. Information 
on the approaches and methodologies used by the government to measure (policy) 
outcomes in their NRP is of paramount interest for this part. The achievements constitute 
the ‘states and effects (A)’ of the ESC framework.  
The following questions can be raised in this respect:  
 Are the definitions of the indicators used in the NRP in line with the definitions of the 
indicators agreed on at the EU level?  
 Are the data sources for the provision of these indicators mentioned and are they 
appropriate for the envisaged indicators? 
 
This implies that as part of the assessment policy measures should be examined with respect 
to the following questions: 
 Which specific input is foreseen? 
 What is said about the process to achieve the intended outcomes? 
 What is the intended output? 
 What is the intended impact? 
 Is a monitoring device determined? 
 Which role is foreseen for the social partners 
One of the major issues for the assessment is to what extent the listing of the measures and 
the monitoring of its efficacy and accuracy refer to the following specific flexicurity 
Guidelines: 
 Guideline 21: to promote flexibility combined with employment security (goal 1) and 
reduce labour market segmentation (goal 2), with the necessary attention to the role 
of the social partners. 
 Guideline 22: To ensure employment-friendly wage and other labour cost 
developments (goal 3). 
 Guideline 23: To expand and improve investment in human capital (goal 4). 
 Guideline 24: To adapt education and training systems in response to new 
competence (goal 5).  




5.2.2 Monitoring the common principles and components of flexicurity using dynamic 
indicators  
 
The first checklist methodology outlined above concentrates on the flexicurity oriented EES 
Guidelines and uses the MS NRP’s to check on the progress and internal consistency of MS 
policies in developing and implementing flexicurity. 
The second checklist methodology takes a different angle by setting out from the 
common principles and components of flexicurity as identified by the EC and approved by 
the Council. Moreover, this methodology is based on the concept of transition or dynamic 
indicators, the development of which is at the core of this research report. The methodology 
which is called the stocks-flows-outcome (SFO)-approach is worked out in chapter 2 whereas 
the indicators are operationalised in chapter 4. A distinction is made between institutional 
and outcome indicators. Dynamic indicators therefore measure changes in flexicurity 
institutions and flexicurity outcomes over time. Dynamic indicators therefore do justice to 
the truly dynamic nature of the flexicurity concept. The further advantage of statistical 
dynamic indicators from the point of monitoring, lies in the fact that, once constructed, 
underpinned by the required statistical data and commonly approved, they do not require 
actions from the MS other than supplying the relevant statistical data to the EU. In other 
words, these indicators can be applied and used for monitoring by the EC (e.g. by the 
country desks) without further input or intervention from the MS.  
 
In chapter 4, we presented and tested the set of indicators whereas in chapter 6 we further 
explain how the indicators can fulfill a role in the policy coordination process at the EU level. 
In this chapter 5 we show how this set can be used for the monitoring of MS flexicurity 
policies.  
In terms of the ESC model we consider the common principles and components of 
flexicurity as (policy) Challenges leading to particular Efforts as agreed upon by the MS. 
Dynamic indicators on institutions and on outcomes can then be seen as indicating the ‘State 
of Flexicurity’ in a country. However, dynamic or flow indicators, other than static or stock 
indicators, do measure ‘active’ States, i.e. changes over time in the various flexicurity 
relevant statuses that individuals have in and outside the labour market. This longitudinal 
nature, usually covering a one year period (but which period can be extended provided the 
availability of data), also implies that dynamic indicators are relevant in view of the 
Challenges dimension of our ESC-model. Which indicators MS themselves want to use is 
likely to be affected by their awareness and acknowledgement of particular challenges. The 
acceptation and introduction of a set of dynamic indicators might therefore contribute to 
MS awareness and the design of new or reinforced policy Efforts. The use of these transition 
indicators then lead to an assessment of the ‘State of Flexicurity’ by the MS. In the next 
stage the outcomes of the MS assessments based on the indicators will be confronted with 
their own goals and targets or those agreed on at the EU level leading to new Challenges to 
be tackled with new Efforts. 
The set of transition indicators can be associated with the common principles and, 
more specifically, the four policy components of flexicurity. The common principles as they 





































Box 5.1 Common Principles of Flexicurity adopted by the EPSCO Council on the 5th of 
December 2007 
 
(1)   Flexicurity is a means to reinforce the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, 
create more and better jobs, modernise labour markets, and promote good work 
through new forms of flexibility and security to increase adaptability, 
employment and social cohesion. 
(2) Flexicurity involves the deliberate combination of flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, comprehensive life long learning strategies, effective active labour 
market policies, and modern, adequate and sustainable social protection 
systems. 
(3) Flexicurity approaches are not about one single labour market or working life 
model, nor about a single policy strategy: they should be tailored to the specific 
circumstances of each Member State. Flexicurity implies a balance between 
rights and responsibilities of all concerned. Based on the common principles, 
each Member State should develop its own flexicurity arrangements. Progress 
should be effectively monitored. 
(4) Flexicurity should promote more open, responsive and inclusive labour markets 
overcoming segmentation. It concerns both those in work and those out of work. 
The inactive, the unemployed, those in undeclared work, in unstable 
employment, or at the margins of the labour market need to be provided with 
better opportunities, economic incentives and supportive measures for easier 
access to work or stepping-stones to assist progress into stable and legally secure 
employment. Support should be available to all those in employment to remain 
employable, progress and manage transitions both in work and between jobs. 
(5) Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external flexicurity are equally 
important and should be promoted. Sufficient contractual flexibility must be 
accompanied by secure transitions from job to job. Upward mobility needs to be 
facilitated, as well as between unemployment or inactivity and work. High-quality 
and productive workplaces, good organisation of work, and continuous upgrading 
of skills are also essential. Social protection should provide incentives and 
support for job transitions and for access to new employment.  
(6) Flexicurity should support gender equality, by promoting equal access to quality 
employment for women and men and offering measures to reconcile work, 
family and private life. 
(7) Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue among all 
stakeholders, where all are prepared to take the responsibility for change with a 
view to socially balanced policies. While public authorities retain an overall 
responsibility, the involvement of social partners in the design and 
implementation of flexicurity policies through social dialogue and collective 
bargaining is of crucial importance. 
(8) Flexicurity requires a cost effective allocation of resources and should remain 
fully compatible with sound and financially sustainable public budgets. It should 
also aim at a fair distribution of costs and benefits, especially between 
businesses, public authorities and individuals, with particular attention to the 





The specific set of dynamic indicators we have developed particularly relates to the following 
common principles: 
 Principle 2: this principle highlights the four policy components of flexicurity (see 
below) 
 Principle 4: this principle emphasizes the importance of ‘good’ transitions in the 
labour market and upward development (stepping stones) 
 Principle 5: this principle stresses internal flexicurity (within the firm) secure 
transitions, the upgrading of skills and new employment opportunities 
 Principle 6: this principle deals with the key goal of the work-life balance and with 
equal access to high quality employment opportunities. 
In the checklist that follows below we take the four flexicurity policy components, as 
referred to under principle 2, as the main flexicurity Challenges leading to particular Efforts 
and measured by the set of indicators: 
 FLCA: flexible and reliable contractual arrangements,  
 LLL: comprehensive life long learning strategies,  
 ALMP: effective active labour market policies and  
 MSS: modern, adequate and sustainable social protection systems 
 
In the checklist we do not separately refer to the relevant common principles as discussed 
above. Principle 4 is addressed by the choice for transition indicators and the way they are 
designed to allow measuring ‘good’ and ‘bad’ transitions. Principle 5 refers to the second 
policy component of Life Long Learning and the indicators we developed on education and 
training. Principle 6 about work-life balance and equal access is being addressed by the 
fourth component of modern social security systems for which we developed various 
separate indicators (see table 5.2) and by disaggregating our indicators by gender and 
education level. Since we focused on developing dynamic outcome indicators and not on the 
institutional indicators for which the data used here are inappropriate we list only these. 
However, for assessing the performance of countries both types of institutional and 
outcome indicators are however important and complement each other to arrive at a 
comprehensive picture. As shown in chapter 3, outcome and institutional indicators provide 
a dissimilar picture on the performance of countries.    
 
Three further general remarks need to be made.  
 First, we assume that for each MS (given the availability of the data) the dynamic 
indicators are actually measured and calculated (using EU data sets) and that this 
information is being made available to the respective EC officials (e.g. country desks).  
 Second, at this stage no targets, norms or bandwidths of outcomes are being defined 
for the dynamic indicators. This can (and should) be done but it requires further 
policy-making by the EC. At this stage we suggest that the checklist takes the EU 
average as the main point of reference, implying the ‘above EU average’ is 
considered a positive score (+), a score ‘at or around European average’ a neutral 
score (0)  and ‘below EU average’ as a score that needs further improvement (-). 
Alternative targets might of course be set (e.g. at which the best performing MS is 
used as the benchmark for those above the European average, and the European 
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average as the benchmark for those MS below the European average) but this goes 
beyond the purpose of the study. 
 Third, neither this set of indicators nor the checklist on which it is based is considered 
to replace other sets of indicators (e.g. the EMCO list of static institutional and 
transition indicators or the various composite indicators developed on the four 
components of flexicurity policies) or checklists (such as the guidelines checklist 
presented in the first part of this chapter). The monitoring of flexicurity policies 
requires a triangulation of various, complementary methodologies.  
 
In the last panel the score of the MS compared to the European average is shown. The 
performance of each MS on these and other indicators can however be compared in various 
ways as already discussed in chapter 4. One obvious way is to use radar charts in which the 
scores of each country and for the EU as a whole on the various indicators of each of the 
four components can be depicted. The separate indicators can also be transformed into 
composite outcome indicators by creating indices for each of the indicators with the 
European average set at 100 and then taking the (un)weighted average of all the constructed 
indices for each of the four components or for all four components jointly. We have not 
done so in chapter 4 since we believe that the single indicators show more clearly the 
performance of countries on each separate dimension of flexicurity. The score on one 
indicator can be quite different from the score on another dependent on the particular 
pathway chosen. Taking the separate indicators together as composite indicators do would 
then blur the picture on the performance of the various countries belonging to different 
pathways on each of its constituent parts and therefore not being very useful for policy 
purposes.  
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Table 5.2. A checklist on dynamic flexicurity outcome indicators 1)  
Dynamic outcome Indicators Level 1: Main Indicators   Score 
Name/description  
Type of flexibility/ 
security Labels  
Benchmark: 
EU average 
I.  FLCA- Flexible and Reliable Contractual Arrangements  
1.1. Flexibility/mobility  E+I Mobility   




1.1.2. Contract mobility CM Mobility E+I Contract mobility +/0/- 
1.1.3. Working-time mobility WTM Mobility E+I Working  time mobility +/0/- 
1.1.4. Occupational mobility 
2
) OM Mobility E+I Occupational class mobility +/0/- 
1.1.5. Wage mobility WM Mobility E+I Wage mobility +/0/- 
1.2. Security    
+/0/- 
1.2.1.  Dynamic Employment 










Security  EPS 





II. Life-long learning and training (LLL)     
2.1. Transitions into permanent 
job after training JMTR 
Employability 
security Training related job mobility 
+/0/- 
III. Active labour market policies (ALMP)    
3.1. Labour market mobility LMREEX 
Job/employment  
security Re-entry/exit mobility 
+/0/- 




Re-entry after x months of 
unemployment 
+/0/- 
IV. Modern social security systems  incl. work-life balance (WLB)   





mobility/improvement NYI Income security 
Net Income (wage+benefit) 
mobility 
+/0/- 
4.3. Income replacement NYIES Income stability 
Income mobility by 
employment status 
+/0/- 
4.4. In-work income security IWYSI 
In-work income 
security  
In-work income security 
gains/losses 
+/0/- 
4.5. In-work income transition 
insecurity  LWYTIS 
In-work income 
insecurity 
Low wage income transition 
insecurity  
+/0/- 




In-work Low wage 
Transition Security 
+/0/- 
4.7: Work-life balance or 
combination security (WLB) WLBS 
Work life balance 
security  
+/0/- 
4.7.1.  WLB employment 
opportunities WLBLMP WLB security 
LMP and part-time work by 
LC stage (annual) 
+/0/- 
4.7.2. WLB employment 
transitions WLBET WLB security 
Employment Transitions by 
LC stage 
+/0/- 
4.7.3. WLB-WCC opportunities WCC WLB security  Participation in WCC +/0/- 
4.7.4. WLB-WCC  transitions WLBTS WLB security  Between WCC transitions +/0/- 




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A METHODOLOGY 







6.1. Introduction and outline 
 
The report aims at developing a framework or methodology for the monitoring of flexicurity 
policies in the MS starting from the premise that process oriented institutional and dynamic 
outcome indicators are a prerequisite for the stocktaking of countries´ progress in improving 
the balancing of flexibility and security goals as being an important objective of flexicurity 
policies at the EU level. The need for defining dynamic indicators is clearly expressed in a 
recent working document authored by the director of the Lisbon Council who referring to 
EU2020, the next 10-year strategy for the EU, stressed the need for “a concerted effort to 
find measurements that can capture the notion of change, of dynamics, of movements in the 
economy and society” (Ann Mettler, EC, COM 2009, 647).   
The underlying study started therefore off by assuming that the monitoring of 
policies requires a dynamic framework that is able to capture changes and dynamics in 
policies and outcomes. The dynamic framework then first, makes a distinction between 
flexicurity as a ‘state of affairs’ and as a ’policy strategy’ for the MS and the EU as a whole.  It 
consists of an analytical model to monitor the ‘states of affairs’ that we named the ‘ Stock-
Flow-Outcome’ or SFO- model,  and a policy monitoring tool that we called the ‘ Efforts-
States-Challenges‘ or ESC-model. The dynamic indicators developed in the SFO framework 
permit to monitor the progress in the ‘states’ part of the ESC framework whereas the 
achieved progress in the policy process as indicated by the efforts-states-challenges policy 
chain  constitutes the institutional context affecting the stocks, flows and outcomes parts of 
the SFO model. In addition the ESC-framework might serve as a tool for developing process 
oriented institutional indicators for monitoring MS progress in the flexicurity domain.   
The theoretical framework (SFO and ESC model) is explained in Chapter 2 and worked 
out for the analytical part (SFO-model) in Chapter 3 and 4 and for the policy strategy part in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 reviews the data sources used (6.2), the selection of transition 
indicators to be used based on some chosen set of selection criteria (6.3) and some 
recommendations on how to innovate the indicator framework with a view to flexicurity and 
work-life balance policies.     
 
6.2. Data sources: Labour Force, Time-Use and SILC-data 
 
One of the criteria to select indicators for monitoring concerns the availability of data 
sources that are regularly updated. In Box 6.1 we list the data sources available for defining 
indicators. A distinction is made between truly longitudinal data such as SILC and repeated 
cross-sections such as the Labour Force Survey. Since the study is aimed at defining dynamic 
indicators at the micro or individual level we especially used longitudinal data, in particular 
EU-SILC. Most of the currently used indicators are static and based on macro-level 
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information on institutions such as the EPL index and the benefit replacement rates. For 
some macro-level information the Labour Force Survey is used but we also examined the 


































Work-life balance and time use data 
We examined the information available in the European time-use data which contain rather 
unique comparative information on the time spent to all kinds of daily activities (work, 
leisure, consumption, caring, housework, shopping etc.) for an increasing number of 
countries. The survey is especially valuable to define time use indicators for the caring of 
children in different life course stages which information is important to define Work Life 
Balance (WLB) indicators.  In the end we did however decide not to define new indicators 
from this source yet since the information to derive from these data happened to be 
available for a limited number of 11 countries and for a few time points only. When the data 
becomes available for all 27 member states in the near future it provides a very useful data 
source for defining indicators on the combination of working, education and caring duties 
Box 6.1: Data sources: longitudinal data 
 
• Panel Data (prospective: repeated observations with same persons) 
– European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 1994-2001 (14 countries) 
– Hungarian panel (1992-7)  
– National panels (UK, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) 
– Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC); 2003 (7 countries), 2003-
2004 (11 countries), 2004-2006 (15 countries); 2005-2006 (26 countries); 
2005-2007 (25 countries). 
– Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement (SHARE), data, 50+ people  (wave 
1: 2003-2004 (11 countries); wave 2: 2005-2006 (14 countries) and 2008-
2009 (16 countries). 
• Life course data (retrospective: biographical information asked at various moments 
about work and/or life history) 
– UK (BHPS), Germany (GLHS), Netherlands (Family Surveys); Belgium (PBSH), 
Sweden (LNU) and Italy (ILFI) 
Repeated cross-sections 
• Labour Force Survey (LFS, small panel part) 1983-2007 (27 countries) 
• Harmonised Time Use data based on diary information (early 2000’s countries), see 
HETUS –database  
• European Working Conditions Survey (repeated cross-sections);  
EWCS 1991(12 countries); 1996(15 countries); 2000/2001 (27countries), 2005 (31 
countries),   2010 (34 countries). 
• European Survey on Working Time and Work-Life Balance  
ESWT 2004/2005/2009 
• European Social Survey (ESS) (survey on opinions, attitudes, values), 2001 (22 
countries), 2003 (26 countries), 2004 (25 countries), 2006 (31 countries), 2008 (28 
countries). 
• European Values Study (EVS) (survey on ideas, values, preferences, attitudes, beliefs 






and work-life balance in general. For this study to gather information on all 27 EU Member 
States we opted for defining WLB indicators using the SILC data. Though the information on 
time spent to caring for children in the SILC data is virtually lacking (though the cross-
sectional data contain information on the use of child care services) we were able to define a 
few relevant indicators at the household level. We started off from theory by viewing the 
different combination strategies households might follow for combining working and caring 
duties. From that framework we defined a classification of work-care combination strategies 
based on the time spent to working by both of the partners and the number of children. 
Then we viewed the changes in the work care combinations between two years and from 
that we derived a transition indicator in terms of the observed changes in work-care 
combinations. This was based on a so-called WLB-matrix of work-care combinations across 
the two years. We examined the transitions from one combination into another the next 
year.  
The time use data would not have allowed us to define dynamic indicators since they 
are cross-sectional data. Hence, we decided to stick to the longitudinal SILC data.  
 
6.3. Defining criteria for the selection of indicators   
Selection criteria 
The choice of the indicators is partly based on an assessment of the strong and weak points 
of the indicators as listed in table 2.1 in chapter 2. This boils down to answering the question 
to what extent the proposed or applied indicators meet some a priori defined criteria. To 
arrive at an agreed list of criteria to be used in the project we first looked into the work of 
the EMCO indicators group on defining indicators (EMCO 2008, 2009) and into the European 
Commission’s report on indicators for monitoring the Employment guidelines (EC, 2007). The 
quality criteria used by the Commission in the latter report were:  
 Policy relevance, 
 Based on reliable statistical data, preferably from Community sources and for entire 
EU27 (EUROSTAT 25% rule), 
 Comparability between Member States, 
 Timeliness and freshness of data,  
 Easy to understand and interpret. 
 
For the review of indicators we derived from the literature some additional substantive and 
methodological criteria which are among others the following: 
 
Substantive: 
 The quality of information the indicators provide about the common principles and the 
integrated guidelines and the coverage of the guidelines. 
 The time frame and nature of the information (static, repeated static, dynamic).  
 The coverage of the various types of flexibility and security as distinguished in the 
flexicurity matrix. 
 The (readily) availability of harmonised, comparable information for recent years  
 The number of countries of the EU covered (most of the 27 countries need to be 
covered).  Eurostat uses for social inclusion indicators the 25% rule, implying that at 




 The complexity of the algorithm and its calculation (indicators should be simple to 
calculate and explain). 
 The decomposition of the indicators, especially by gender and social group.  
 The measurement level of the indicators and whether it concerns single or composite 
indicators. 
 In the case of composite indicators; the normalisation and weighting procedures that 
are used.  
 The methodology to derive the single as well as composite indicators.  
 The methods that enables visualisation of the performance of countries and pathways, 
both static as well as over time (radar charts, 3-D plots etc.).   
 
For the selection of the indicators we finally limited ourselves to in our view the most 
important criteria from a policy perspective:  
 Plausibility of the evidence provided and reliability of the data 
 Availability of data for most of the 27 EU member states 
 Timeliness and freshness of the data: data must be up-to-date  
 Choice for a list of single indicators instead of composite indicators 
 Focus on measuring changes and dynamics, that is on dynamic outcome indicators 
instead of on static and institutional indicators 
 Simple algorithms to calculate the indicators and easy to understand for the broader 
audience 
 The decomposition of the indicators by gender, employment status, age and 
education level 
 The quality of the information with respect to the substance of the indicators and the 
coverage of the four main flexicurity domains: flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, life-long learning, active labour market policies and modern social 
security systems. 
Using these latter criteria we defined a list of more than 20 level 1 indicators. For day-to-day 
policy purposes this list of about 20 indicators might still be too long.  The further reduction 
though of the list into a more limited set might be needed for day-to-day policy purposes. 
 
 
6.4  A list of Transition Outcome Indicators on Flexicurity and Work-Life Balance 
 
This study reports on the development of a methodology for defining dynamic indicators on 
the performance of countries in the four domains of flexicurity policies (FLCA, LLL, ALMP and 
MSS). We commenced with viewing the list of EMCO indicators as reported in their latest 
2009 progress report (EMCO, 2009). We judged their input-progress-output model a 
valuable approach that we thought would benefit from further work on transition indicators 
as we aimed at in this report.  
We used the SILC data for 2005-2006/2007 to arrive finally at a set of 20 indicators 
which are listed in Table 6.1. We include detailed information about these indicators: 
description/name, type of security provided, acronym and label, data source and 
disaggregation possibilities. The set of 20 main or level 1 indicators is further disaggregated 
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into level 2 sub-indicators aimed at distinguishing ‘good’ (upward moves) from ‘bad’ 
transitions (downward moves) and level 3 analysis indicators where a further distinction can 
be made for upward and downward transitions by sex, education level, sector, age and life 
course stage.  
Some of the income indicators provide information on 15 countries only due to the 
reference period of the information going back to the previous calendar year (2004-2005). 
We kept these indicators in the list since at the start of the research and the time of creating 
these indicators we had the data for 2003-2006 only covering 15 countries for the transition 
of 2004 to 2005.  At the moment of writing (March 2010) data have become available which 
would allow us to include 25 countries for the transition 2005 to 2007.          
The 20 main indicators show that the EU-SILC data are a useful source of information 
for the development of dynamic transition indicators to monitor the progress made in the 
framework of FLC/WLB policies at the MS level. The set now includes dynamic indicators for 
all four domains including life-long learning and active labour market policies. A further 
reduction of the 20 indicators into a limited number of 8 or 4 (1 or 2 for each policy domain) 
might be needed for policy purposes. The choice will then likely to be based on other than 
purely methodological or academic criteria (e.g. political desiderata) and be made in the 
social dialogue process at the EU level. Composite indicators seems at first sight attractive 
while they reduce the information contained in large sets of indicators into one or a few 
single metrics (e.g. on each of the four basic domains of flexicurity policies) but they also 
share an important drawback, that is, that they hide the underlying single policy measures 
which might be held responsible for the observed differences in outcomes across countries. 
One example is the overall EPL that without separating it into the three underlying 
components, EPL for regular jobs, temporary jobs and dismissal protection, gives a blurred 
picture of what’s going on in terms of flexibility at the country level. Also a composite 
indicator on life-long learning in which the share of participating employees, the investments 
in and costs of training, its duration and its level are summarized in one single metric might 
blur the comparison when single indicators level each other out or when they show a very 
different profile. For policy purposes we therefore need to select a few well-chosen single 
indicators which are capable of telling a clear story.  Composite indicators are however 
important for analytical purposes to examine the combined effect of particular policy 
measures on the performance of the MS labour markets.     
 
6.5  Conclusions with respect to the SFO and ESC-framework 
  
The Stocks-Flows-Outcome framework 
The SFO framework appeared useful to arrive at the definition of institutional and transition 
outcome indicators. The interest for dynamic indicators is growing due to the increasing 
volatility of labour markets and the larger importance attached to it in the economic, social 
and environmental policy domain at the EU level where the focus shifts to measuring 
change, transitions or dynamics instead of only states. To date, indicators were mainly static 
based on repeated cross-sectional data, in particular the Labour Force Survey, but thanks to 
the availability of the longitudinal SILC data covering the entire EU27, more dynamic 
indicators are potentially available. We believe the use of longitudinal data to be important 
for the monitoring of progress in the social domain for the years to come, especially with a 
view to EU2020, the next 10-year strategy of the EU.  Data are needed to monitor change 
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and either they become available in the form of continuation of existing or the creation of 
new prospective (panel studies) and retrospective data (life-history data).   
Building on the SFO-framework we hold a plea for:  
 Defining indicators separately for flexibility and security, so as not to combine 
them into flexicurity measures, and for formulating indicators on the various 
components of flexibility and security, such as on internal and external, and 
numerical and functional flexibility and on income, employment, 
employability and work life balance or combination security 
 Defining separate dynamic institutional and outcome indicators. A list of 
dynamic institutional and outcome indicators is presented in Table 2.1 in 
chapter 2. The focus in the project though has been on defining transition 
indicators using the SILC panel data for 2005-2006/2007 covering 26 countries 
of the EU.  
 Defining transition and duration indicators, being indicators measuring the 
residence or stay in particular states contingent upon previous duration (see 
Table 2.1.). We hence formulated just for illustrative purposes the share of 
people still in unemployment after x months of unemployment. This measure 
of survival after x months can also be calculated on stays in e.g. training, 
education, social protection or life course stage (calculating how long it takes 
for young school leavers to find a permanent job). 
 Defining measures for transitions at the household level and the work life 
balance, the latter pertaining to transitions between various work-care 
combinations. Though we lack information on time spent to child care we 
were able using the SILC data to define a transition measure indicating the 
transitions between various work-care combinations.        
 
Comparing country scores  
In the end in chapter 4 more than 20 level-1 main indicators were defined including the two 
transition indicators on employment and employment-pay security formulated by the 
EMCO-IG group.  
All these indicators might be straightforwardly used to compare the scores of all the 
countries on the four policy domains to which they refer. The level 1 indicators seem 
particularly useful for policy purposes whereas the further disaggregated level-2 (upward-
downward) and level-3 scores by sex, education level, sector, age or life course stage might 
be particularly useful for analytical purposes (see Table 6.1 for an overview). Definitions of 





Table 6.1. List of Flexicurity Transition-Outcome Indicators  
 
Outcome Indicators Level 1: Main Indicators   Level 2: Sub-Indicators Level 3: Analysis Indicators    
Name/description Level 1 
Type of flexibility/ 
security Labels  Level 2 Labels  
Disaggregation 
Level 3 Population Source 
I.  FLCA- Flexible and Reliable Contractual Arrangements      
1.1. Flexibility/mobility  
External+Internal 
Mobility (E+I)        
1.1.1. Job mobility VIJM E+I Mobility  
Voluntary job 
mobility VJMP 








    
Involuntary job 
mobility IJMP 
involuntary job mobility 
permanent job       
    
voluntary job 
mobility VJMT 








    
involuntary job 
mobility IJMT 
involuntary job mobility 
temporary job       





      CMTP 
contract mobility 
temporary to permanent       
1.1.3. Working-time 
mobility WTM E+I Mobility 
Working time 
mobility WTMU 






      WTMD 
downward working time 
mobility      
1.1.4. Occupational 
mobility *) OM E+I Mobility 
Occupational class 





       OML lateral class mobility       
      OMD downward class mobility       










1.2. Security Level 1 
Employment 
security Labels Level 2 Labels Level 3  Population Source  
1.2.1.  Dynamic 









education, sector Pop.16-64 SILCL 
     ESID 
downward employment 
security      
1.2.2. EMCO-




security transitions EST 
lateral plus upward 
employment transitions 
sex, age, 
education, sector Pop.16-64 SILCL 
1.2.3. EMCO-
Employment-Pay 
Security  EPS 
Employment  pay 
security 
Employment-pay 
transition security EPSU 






    EPSD 
downward  employment-
pay security    
II. Life-long learning and training 
(LLL) 
Employability 
security       
2.1. Transitions into 




Training related job 
mobility JMTRP 
job mobility after training 
to permanent job 
sex, age, 
education, sector Pop.16-64 SILCL 
    JMTRT 
job mobility after training 
to temporary job      
III. Active labour market policies 
(ALMP)        
3.1. Labour market 
mobility LMREEX 
Job/employment  
security Re-entry mobility LMRE re-entry mobility 
sex, age, 
education, sector Une/Ina 16-64 SILCL 
    Exit mobility LMEX exit mobility   
Employed 16-
64 SILCL 
3.2. Labour Market Re-
Entry Chances LMREXM 
Job/employment 
security 
Re-entry after x 
months of 











upward - out of 
poverty sex, age, education Pop. 16-64 SILCL 
    YSID 
downward - into 





Net Income (wage + 
benefit) mobility NYIU income gain sex, age, education Pop.16-64 SILCL 





Income mobility by 
employment status YMU 
income mobility 
unemployed sex, age, education Pop.16-64 SILCL 
    YME 
income mobility 
employed     





security gains/losses IWYSU 
in-work upward -out of 




    IWYSD 





4.5. In-work income 
transition insecurity  LWYTIS 
In-work income 
insecurity 
Low wage income 
transition insecurity  LWYTISEX 
exit low-wage & 




    LWYTISEN 
entry low-wage & 
poverty     




In-work Low wage 
Transition Security IWLWTSU 
upward low-wage 
mobility sex, age, education 
Employed low-
wage and poor 
16-64 SILCL 
    IWLWTSD 
downward low-wage 




4.7. Work-life balance 
security (WLB) Level 1 WLB security Labels Level 2 Labels Level 3 Population Source 
4.7.1.  WLB employment 
opportunities WLBLMP WLB security 
LMP by LC stage 
(annual) LMPLC 
labour market 
participation by LC 
stage sex, LC stage Pop.16-64 SILCR+L 
     
Part-time work by LC 
stage (annual) PTLC part-time work by LCS sex, LC stage Pop.16-64 SILCR+L 
4.7.2. WLB employment 
transitions WLBET WLB security 
Employment 
Transitions by LC 
stage LMRELC 
re-entry mobility by 
LCS sex, LC stage Une/Ina 16-64 SILCL 
       LMEXLC exit mobility by LCS sex, LC stage Employed 16-64 SILCL 
4.7.3. WLB-WCC 
opportunities WCC WLB security  Participation in WCC WCCA 
participation in each 
WCC, all HH sex, LC stage Pop.16-64 SILCR+L 
    WCCE 
participation in each 
WCC, employed HH sex, LC stage Employed 16-64 SILCR+L 
4.7.4. WLB-WCC  
transitions WLBTS WLB security  
Between WCC 
transitions WLBTSU upward WLB security sex, LC stage Pop.16-64 SILCL 
    WLBTSD 
downward WLB 
security sex, LC stage Pop.16-64 SILCL 
Notes: *) Not available in the SILC-longitudinal data       
Une=unemployed; Ina=inactive (not working) population; E+I=external plus 
internal; LM=labour market; LCS=life course stage      
WCC=work-care combinations defined by number of hours work and care in households 





Single versus composite indicators 
The indicators can be used as single indicators or as composite indicators. In the latter case 
the single scores are first transformed into indices taking the European average as the 
benchmark or unit (set at 100) and then calculating the (un)weighted mean of all single 
indicators per domain or over all domains. In the final step one can calculate scores for each 
country, the EU as such, or for various clusters of countries.  
To arrive at an overall picture of the performance of countries on flexicurity the set of 
transition outcome indicators developed in this project need to be supplemented with the 
set of static institutional indicators, being summarized in chapter 4. These institutional 
indicators should preferably be used as time series indicating changes in policies and 
institutions over time.  
 
Presentation of outcomes  
For presentation purposes the use of radar charts might be an obvious way to visualize the 
outcomes derived from these indicators but alternative ways such as cross-tables or bar 
charts by country are also conceivable. In the end, the two pictures derived from the 
institutional indicators on the one hand and the dynamic outcome indicators on the other 
should be taken together and compared. This can be achieved for each country or across 
countries and pathways. Incongruence between the pictures based on the institutional 
versus the outcome indicators might lead to define new policy challenges leading to new 
policy efforts.  
From an analytical perspective one might even go a step further in analyzing the 
relationship between the institutional and transition outcome indicators. One can examine 
the direct impact of institutions on outcomes by taking the single or composite institutional 
indicators as explanatory factors in statistical analytical models aimed at explaining the 
country’s scores on transition outcomes with respect to job-to-job and contract mobility, 
and to income, employment and work-life balance security. One then gets insight into the 
single and combined effect of particular policies and measures on the desired outcomes in 
terms of balancing flexibility and security goals after correcting for obvious compositional 
differences across the countries. This renders further evidence for defining new challenges 
and new policy efforts.   
 
The Efforts-States-Challenges framework 
In chapter 2 we developed and explained our ‘Efforts-States-Challenges’ model to monitor 
flexicurity conceived as a ‘policy strategy’ for the EU and the individual MS.  In chapter 5 we 
showed how the ESC model can be translated into a general framework for the monitoring 
of MS policies in the flexicurity domain. We also showed how the framework might fulfil a 
role in the EES as a monitoring framework for the reporting of MS in their National Reform 
Plans on the progress achieved in flexicurity policies. In the end we translated the general 
framework into two checklists. The first checklist methodology focuses on assessing the 
policy efforts put in by Member States in achieving the flexicurity oriented goals formulated 
in the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Lisbon Agenda. This is done by checking 
whether these policy efforts are aligned with the EU policy guidelines (EES and Lisbon 
Agenda), whether they are internally consistent and operationalised with clear and 
quantified goals which can be monitored. The second checklist methodology takes the 
common principles and components of flexicurity as a starting point and uses the designed 
set of 20 level-1 main dynamic indicators supplemented with institutional indicators to 
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measure the progress MS make along the common principles and the four flexicurity 
components.  
The next step then might be to assess whether countries indeed over time make 
progress in achieving the commonly agreed goals as formulated by the guidelines and the 
commonly agreed flexicurity principles. For each of the chosen indicators very concrete 
targets or norms might be set along which progress in the domain of flexicurity policies can 
be evaluated.  The existing EES targets with respect to the level of employment for particular 
groups might then be supplemented with these new targets on a subset of the indicators. 
However, such targets are not yet available and need also to be subject of the social 
dialogue and consultation process at the EU level. Therefore we took the European average 
as the benchmark to examine to what extent member states perform better or worse than 
this benchmark and to assess MS progress over time. Instead of the European average the 
benchmark might also differ for member states performing below or above the EU average. 
For MS performing better than the average the best performing member state might be the 
benchmark.   
 We believe and hope that the SFO and ESC framework we developed in this study to 
monitor progress in the domains of flexicurity and work-life balance policies and its 
constituent components culminating in a limited set of transition indicators provide a helpful 
tool to measure and therewith achieve progress in the flexicurity domain at the MS and at 
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TYPES OF FLEXICURITY AND EES INDICATORS   
 
 
Table A1: Classification of types of flexibility and security and their linkage 
 




 Working Hours Flexibility 
(part-time; overtime; 
multiple jobs) 
S1. Job security    Security of 
employment in 
current job  
  Working Time Flexibility 
(flexible WT, WT accounts; 
career breaks, leave options; 
flexible pensions) 
S2. Work-life 
balance  or 
combination 
security 
 Availability of child 
care relief, working 
time and 
care/education leave 




 Contract flexibility (temp 
agency; casual; fixed-term; 
on-call; hours; in-
outsourcing; subcontracting; 
homework; telework; labour 
pool) 
S3. Employment/ 
 contract security 











 Labour input flexibility  
(multi-skilling; multi-tasking; 




 Opportunities to 
acquire and maintain 
skills 
  S5. Representation 
security 







  S6. Workplace 
security  
 Safe/ Healthy 
workplaces 
F5. Wage flexibility  Wage/Pay flexibility 
(wage/salary changes; 
average pay; performance 
related pay; anciennity pay; 




 Fair/equal pay 
 Safeguarding income 
against social risks 




Table A1.2 Indicators on flexicurity within the EES (guideline 21) 
 
GL 
21 Promote flexibility combined with employment security ......  




Transitions by type 
of contract 
 
Transitions between non-employment and 
employment and within employment by type of 












Non-standard employed broken down by part-
time, fixed-term, part-time and fixed-term as % 







Accidents at work 
 
 
Index of the number of serious and fatal 










Size of undeclared work in national economy 







Average weekly number of hours usually 












Transitions by pay 
level 
 
Transitions between non-employment and 
employment and within employment by pay 






Growth in labour 
productivity 
















N of persons employed in newly born and 
surviving enterprises (set ups up to t-3) in 
relation to employed in all active enterprises (in 
year n)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
